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Corporate Governance of 
 Innovation in Singapore Chinese Family Business 
By  
Ong Geok Chwee 
 
Despite the large number of research publications on innovation management 
matters, there is still a gap in the understanding of effective innovation governance at 
corporate levels. The mechanisms that drive effective governance at firm level to 
ensure the “alignment of goals, allocation of resources and assignment of decision-
making authority for innovation across the company, and with external parties” 
(Deschamps, 2013) remain unclear. Given the importance of family firms in Asia (and 
beyond), there is an urgent need to examine those family factors that influence the 
effectiveness of corporate governance of innovation in Asian enterprise. Against this 
background, this study attempts to contribute to the innovation literature by (i) 
developing a new model of corporate innovation governance for Singapore Chinese 
family firms; (ii) defining the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors in these 
family-based firms with regard to governing innovation; and (iii) creating a checklist 
to support both board members and CEOs of local family firms to better govern and 
manage organisational innovation efforts at corporate levels. 
 
A qualitative research approach was used to provide rich insights into the “why” 
and “how” of the corporate governance of innovation in an Asian business context, 




which is still poorly understood. During phase 1, we interviewed ten experts in areas 
related to innovation, governance and Chinese family firms. Using the insights 
generated, we created semi-structured interview questions for the subsequent phase 2 
case study research. For each of the four case studies, interviews were conducted with 
two to three key executives of the firms to gather deeper insights into the research topic 
and to ensure a high level of data validity. 
 
                Using a grounded theory approach, we formulated an actionable, corporate 
innovation governance model that points the way ahead for the leaders of Singapore 
Chinese family firms towards continued value creation. Our research suggests that there 
is a clear gap between the expert views concerning the desired roles and responsibilities 
of the board of directors with regard to innovation governance and the actual practices 
observed in Singapore Chinese family firms. One of the key issues is the lack of domain 
expertise and experience in innovation management at the board level. Based on the 
qualitative research, we developed propositions on the antecedents to board’s pro-
activeness (e.g. shareholders’ expectations), and family influence factors (e.g. 
cohesiveness among family members involved in business operation), that affect the 
governance of innovation. Besides discussing the theoretical implications of the 
research findings such as the impact of innovation leadership on the corporate 
governance of innovation in Singapore Chinese family firms, the dissertation concludes 
with a novel checklist to inform top business leaders about key variables and aspects 
that affect the effectiveness of making corporate innovation governance work such as 
innovation leadership, innovation capabilities and clarity of innovation strategy.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of innovation for driving a firm's performance, business 
viability and sustainability has been discussed both by practitioners and scholars. 
Businesses are grappling with the speed of change concerning consumer behaviours, 
technological disruption and the need to reconfigure operations to adapt to such 
changes. The speed of market changes implies that innovation is increasingly 
critical to a firm's long-term survival. Organisations need managers who are 
ambidextrous and strike a balance between evolutionary and revolutionary changes 
(Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2008). March (1991, p. 71) 
suggested that "maintaining an appropriate balance between exploration and 
exploitation is a primary factor in system survival and prosperity".  
 
A survey of research papers concerning innovation will return a vast number 
of scholarly works including innovation incubation, development, 
commercialisation, innovation investment portfolio, leadership and more. There is 
also consensus among researchers regarding the positive relationship between 
innovation and performance. Many researchers have focused on examining the 
innovation process, innovation input and the innovation outcome of family as well 
as non-family firms. However, research about the corporate governance model 
of innovation is limited (Miozzo & Dewick, 2002). In our opinion, corporate 
innovation governance is critical to provide an overarching strategic direction and 
operational framework to ensure that the business maintains the balance between 
“exploitation” and “exploration” activities (March, 1991).  
 




We define the governance of innovation at the corporate level as 
“Corporate governance of innovation” (CGOI), aligned with Deschamps’s (2013) 
definition of "a system of mechanisms that aligns goals, allocates resources and 
assigns decision-making authority for innovation across the company, and 
with external parties". CGOI provides clarity regarding why, what, where, when 
and how much to invest as well as who is authorised to decide. O'Sullivan (2000) 
posits that the corporate governance literature focuses on a variety of mechanisms 
to solve agency problems, which ensures that financiers’ funds are not wasted on 
unattractive projects but provides no systematic explanation of the conditions under 
which managers will make investments that promote or discourage innovation. The 
clear research void concerning CGOI motivates us to focus our research in this area 
in order to contribute to an improved corporate governance of innovation. 
 
1.1 How Should Innovation be Governed in Chinese Family Firms? 
 
According to Gersick (1997), two-thirds of all enterprises worldwide are owned 
and/or managed by families. Large bodies of research have examined innovation in 
family businesses (Kraus et al., 2011; Xi et al., 2015) with conflicting views 
regarding whether family or non-family businesses are more innovative (Cassia et 
al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 2012; De Massis et al., 2013, 2015; Kraus et al., 2012). 
Enterprises in Asia are dominated by Chinese families (Menkhoff & Gerke, 2004). 
We define Chinese family firms as businesses that are majority owned by ethnic 
Chinese business leaders and/or managed by their family members. Singapore 
Chinese family firms are found to “combine Chinese tradition with modern Western 
management style” (Zang, 1999, p. 874). While Singapore Chinese family 




businesses incorporate modern Western management style, the Chinese values and 
traditions passed down from company founders are observed as profoundly 
influencing the businesses (Tan & Fock, 2001). This thus forms an interesting 
subject for research, as the findings derived could potentially extend to Chinese 
family firms in Southeast Asia. Many of these firms comprise similar cases of ethnic 
Chinese founders passing on their family business to younger generation leaders 
who are educated under a Western management system.  
 
 
1.1.1 Who is Responsible for the Corporate Governance of Innovation?  
 
Deschamps and Nelson (2014) submit their views concerning innovation 
governance and the importance of boards for driving both the "contents" and 
"process" of innovation. While there is consensus regarding the importance of 
innovation for organisations’ long-term sustainable growth, there is a lack of clarity 
with regard to the roles of boards and top management in ensuring innovation 
investment and culture. In the 2015 Singapore Board of Directors Survey (SID, 
2015), innovation was not included in the top five areas of focus for the respondents 
to the survey. Instead, the top five areas were business performance, strategy 
development, strategy execution, corporate governance and compliance as well as 
risk management. Innovation was assigned an importance of 0.26 on a scale of 0 to 
5, with 5 being most important in this survey. This seems to indicate that boards of 
directors do not perceive innovation governance as a critical role for which they are 
responsible. The role of the board in driving corporate innovation governance is 
important in large organisations, especially when applying the perspective of 
“agency theory” (Ross, 1973) where professional managers in control of a 




company’s operations may not act in the interest of shareholders. Agency problems 
may undermine incentives for executives to innovate (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
as such investments are often deemed high risk and do not produce immediate 
returns.  
 
Would the role of the board in governing innovation be different in Chinese 
family firms? It is not uncommon to observe that the chairman of the board is often 
a role adopted by a family leader of the Chinese family firm. The significant 
involvement of family members at both board and executive levels reduces agency 
costs that often exist in large, non-family firms. Stewardship theory (Davis, 
Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997) better supports the model of family firm operations 
where there is alignment of interest between the owner and managers of the firm, 
since these positions often comprise the same people in family firms. In Chinese 
family businesses with controlling power from family leaders at the board level, 
which roles should independent directors adopt to drive the intended outcome for 
governing innovation? Le Breton-Miller et al. (2013) posit that the board 
composition that best supports the long-term survival of family firms changes with 
the evolution of family firms and family involvements which impacts the socio-
emotional wealth priorities of family firms. However, there has been little research 
into the role of the board in the corporate governance of innovation in family firms. 
Our research contributes to this research gap and guides practitioners in their quest 
for better corporate governance of innovation at the board level in Chinese family 
firms. 
 




1.1.2 Family Influence in the Corporate Governance of Innovation  
 
In a survey conducted by PWC (PWC, 2018, p. 8), 80% of the 2950 respondents 
comprised of executives of family businesses across the globe who cited innovation, 
digitalisation and technology as their top challenges in sustaining growth over the 
next two years. KPMG conducted a survey in May 2017 (KPMG, 2017) on 100 
Singapore family businesses and discovered that 53% have no plan to inculcate 
innovation culture in their organisation. The results of these surveys indicate gaps 
in family businesses in governing innovation.  
 
Many research projects concerning family firms have also uncovered social-
emotional factors as key variables that affect the decision-making process (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2007). Family firms exhibit long-term orientation, long-term leader 
tenures, tacit knowledge, strong family bonds and social networks which contribute 
to their elevated ability to innovate, while their willingness to innovate is heavily 
influenced by the family owners’ goals, intentions, motivations and socioemotional 
concerns (Chrisma et al., 2015; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). How would family 
influence the way Chinese family firms govern innovation at corporate levels? This 
is clearly an area that lacks sufficient research focus and clarity.  
 
1.2 Relevance of Research 
 
The research gap with regard to the corporate governance of innovation in 
Chinese family firms motivates us to conduct a qualitative study in order to better 




understand the unexplored dynamics in this area. This study attempts to contribute 
to the innovation literature through exploring the following three research questions: 
 
• What is the role of the board in the corporate governance of innovation in 
Singapore Chinese family firms? 
 
• How does family influence affect the corporate governance of innovation in 
Singapore Chinese family firms? 
 
• What are the key constructs of the corporate governance of innovation 
model for Singapore Chinese family firms? 
 
This research aims to expand our understanding of the corporate governance of 
innovation model in Singapore Chinese family firms. A checklist is also developed 
to support the boards and top management of Chinese family firms towards 
improving the corporate governance of innovation. A qualitative research 
methodology is used to effectively seek clarity behind the “why”, “what”, “where”, 
“when” and “how” of Singapore Chinese family firms’ corporate governance of 
innovation models.  
 
  




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 This chapter focuses on the review of literature developed by scholars in the 
area of innovation governance and family firms and is organised into three parts. 
The first part reviews the literature in the area of innovation and innovation 
governance. The second part introduces the extant literature on theoretical 
perspectives of family firms. The final part discusses innovation governance in the 
distinct business system of family firms. 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance of Innovation 
 
As the business environment continues to rapidly evolve, innovation is widely 
regarded as a critical source of competitive advantage for any organisation (Dess & 
Picken, 2000; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996). A plethora of research has been 
conducted in the area of innovation ranging from measurement of innovation 
performance (Cordero, 1990), product innovation process (Cormican & O'Sullivan, 
2004), portfolio management (Mcgrath & Macmillian, 2000; Mcgrath, 2010) to 
innovation process measurement (Adams et al., 2006). While scholars have 
affirmed innovation’s importance as a competitive advantage for a firm’s success, 
it is often difficult for outside stakeholders and capital markets to evaluate. Hence, 
management judgement and persistency play a significant role in governing 
innovation (Christensen & Raynor, 2003; Liu, Chen & Wong, 2017).  
 
Due to the complexity surrounding how innovation can be managed, Adams 
(2006) performed a systemic review of the extant bodies of literature and 




synthesised a framework consisting of seven dimensions of innovation management 
in order to enable firms to perform self-assessment. The seven dimensions of 
innovation management are: input management, knowledge management, 
innovation strategy, organisational culture and structure, portfolio management, 
project management and commercialisation (Adams, 2006). Crossan and Apaydin 
(2010) used a similar approach in analysing the large body of innovation 
management literature and developed a multi-dimensional framework of 
organisational innovation which links the three meta-constructs of innovation 
determinants: leadership, managerial levers and business processes. Such 
frameworks contribute to the academic and practitioner understanding of the 
complexity and various components that drive the input, process and outcome of 
innovation at the firm level. 
 
While many researchers have studied the various components of the complex 
process of innovation management in an organisation, there is a lack of clarity 
regarding innovation governance at corporate levels. As Crossan and Apaydin 
(2010) point out, "The role of leadership at all levels of an organization, although 
sometimes tacit, is paramount for spearheading innovation as a process and 
maintaining its momentum until innovation as an outcome ensues" (p. 1156). Smith 
and Tushman (2005) posit that “paradoxical cognition, cognitive frames and 
processes that allow teams to effectively embrace, rather than avoid, contradictions” 
(p. 533) will enable top management teams’ effectiveness in managing the strategic 
contradiction of balancing exploitation with exploration. The complexity described 
in the model submitted by Smith and Tushman (2005) reinforced the need for the 
board to play a critical role in innovation governance, which Deschamps and Nelson 




(2014) described in terms of who innovates, how to innovate as well as what and 
how much to innovate.  
 
Deschamps (2013) defined innovation governance as "a system of 
mechanisms that aligns goals, allocates resources and assigns decision-making 
authority for innovation across the company, and with external parties". He 
further recommended boards to drive innovation governance through reviewing 
innovation strategies, managing innovation risks, auditing innovation effectiveness, 
assessing innovation performance and appointing top management with innovation 
focus. We thus term Deschamps’s (2013) definition of innovation governance as 
the “corporate governance of innovation”.  
 
The corporate governance literature (O'Sullivan, 2000) focuses on a variety of 
mechanisms to solve agency problems to ensure the interest of shareholders but 
provides no systematic explanation of the conditions under which managers will 
make investments that promote or discourage innovation. O’Sullivan (2000, p. 410) 
posits that “the resource allocation process that generates innovation is 
developmental, organisational and strategic implies that, at any point in time, a 
system of corporate governance supports innovation by generating three conditions: 
financial commitment, organisational integration and insider control”. By 
developmental, O’Sullivan (2000) means that innovation involves irreversible 
commitments of resources for uncertain returns. Hence, one condition for 
innovation to occur is financial commitment, as decisions need to be made 
regarding investment in a specific area of exploration. O’Sullivan (2000) further 
argued that innovation is organisational as collective learning is directly influenced 




by the manner in which work is organised. Organisational integration describes the 
integrated structure of work and collective learning processes that generate 
knowledge which cannot be replicated by competitors merely through assembling 
similar resources. O’Sullivan’s third condition of “insider control” is based on the 
fact that innovation investment is a strategic decision, and the controlling party must 
have interest in committing to the investment in innovation after consideration of 
its uncertainty.  
 
O’Sullivan’s (2000) argument for further research into governing innovation in 
relation to corporate governance resonates with our research intention. While much 
research has explored the need to innovate, the complexity of enabling an 
organisation to effectively explore and exploit leads to the need for a model in order 
to enable the board and top management team to make sense of the complexity as 
well as to guide efforts to effectively enable an organisation to achieve the positive 
outcome of innovation investment. In light of innovation’s importance to ensuring 
longevity and sustainable growth of a business, conducting research into the 
corporate governance of innovation would be valuable to both academics and 
practitioners.  
 
2.1.1 Role of the Board in the Corporate Governance of Innovation 
 
McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) describe the board’s role regarding strategy 
using three modes of behaviour: "taking a strategic decision", "shaping strategic 
decisions" and "shaping the content, context and conduct of strategy". Stiles (2001) 
found that strategy is typically formulated at the business-unit level, but the board 




plays an important role in setting the strategic parameters within which strategic 
activity can occur. One could argue that "innovation strategy" is part of the broader 
scope of the organisational strategy. Ramanujam and Mensch (1985) advocated a 
conscious assessment of the strategic choices involved in innovation management, 
which encompasses innovation goals, allocation of resources to innovative 
activities, risks of innovation, timing aspects and a master plan. Andrews (1980) 
further highlighted that the board should be responsible for reviewing the 
organisation's corporate strategy and that through intimate involvement in corporate 
strategy, it can "emphasize and contribute to the search for a new opportunity" (p. 
42).  
 
Boards have dual roles to both monitor the performance of management and 
to provide advice (Adam, 2007). Agency problems may undermine firm incentives 
to innovate (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Bernstein (2014) found that going public 
affects the innovation strategy of a firm. Public firms seem to produce more 
incremental innovation and acquire new technology through merger and acquisition 
activities. Balsmeier and Manso (2017) argued that more independent boards 
increased exploitation of previously successful areas of expertise as stronger board 
oversight increased managerial efforts and risk aversion. Such focus on exploitation 
instead of exploration would be detrimental to the sustainable growth of a business. 
The dual role of boards to monitor the performance of managers as well as their 
advisory role to enable executives to make better quality decisions implies a need 
for a clear innovation governance framework to enable boards’ effectiveness to 
support the C-suites regarding innovation management. Zhou (2016) studied the 
relationship between board governance and managerial risk-taking and found that 




board governance entails positive effects on managerial risk-taking which leads to 
higher investment in R&D expenditures over multiple years. This implies that board 
governance concerning innovation is of paramount importance for the long-term 
growth of a firm. Zhou (2016) further argued that board governance is expected to 
prevent managers' myopic investment behaviours since strategic decision-making 
roles are assigned to a corporate board.  
 
Deschamps and Nelson (2014) posits that the board’s duty in governance 
impacting innovation can be grouped into two key areas. The first involves 
innovation strategy where the board has the duty to audit the company’s innovation 
performance as well as define acceptable ranges of risk, while the second regards 
performance review and C-suite nominations. Deschamps (2018) further suggested 
that the board should be looking beyond CEO nominations and also ensure that the 
CEO is supported by C-suites that have complementary profiles as a team in order 
to drive innovation and transformation in the organisation.  
 
Zahra and Pearce (1990) found that the board’s strategic involvement is 
positively associated with the efficiency of the internal board operations. Zahra and 
Pearce (1989) define internal board operations as “variables that influence a board’s 
decision-making process” including frequency of board meetings, organisation of 
boards into specialised committees, flow of information etc. Many scholars have 
found that processes are important determinants of the board’s effectiveness in 
fulfilling control and strategy tasks (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Gabrielsson & 
Winlund, 2000; Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand, 1996). This encourages us to inject 
clarity into the innovation governance process of the board in order to contribute to 




the board’s effectiveness in the strategic involvement of innovation’s corporate 
governance.  
 
Besides the board’s processes, board diversity and its impact on firm 
performance and innovativeness have also gained increased attention and interest 
from researchers. The behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) posits 
that innovation in organisations is influenced by the extensiveness of the solution-
searching and decision-making processes. When the search process for solutions to 
a specific problem is conducted by a homogenous group that focuses only on areas 
in which group members have prior experience, the decision reached may be biased 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Board diversity in terms of gender and education has 
also been found to contribute to a firm’s increased tendency to invest in R&D, while 
tenure diversity has a negative effect by reducing this tendency (Midavaine et al., 
2016).  
 
In family firms, the majority shareholders of a company occupy a large share 
of board seats due to overlap among shareholders, directors and managers (Gersick 
et al., 1997). It is also not uncommon for the chairman of the board of family firms 
to typically be a key family leader. The involvement of family members at the board 
level impacts the effectiveness of board processes such as how the board’s expertise 
and knowledge are leveraged, the board’s level of involvement in strategic decision-
making processes as well as the extent of cognitive conflict (Zattoni et al., 2015; 
Forbes & Milliken, 1999). We believe that the dynamics of familial influence at the 
board level will have a similar effect that must be considered to achieve effective 
corporate governance of innovation. Because research into the corporate 




governance of innovation is at a nascent stage, there is a lack of current literature 
that studies the influence of family factors at the board level, which may impact the 
effectiveness of the governance process of innovation. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Perspectives on Family Firms 
 
There are various theories developed that contribute to the explanation of 
various aspects of family firms (Chrisman, Kellermanns, Chans & Liano, 2010). In 
this section, we examine the family variables derived from agency theory, the 
behavioural agency model, stewardship theory and the resource-based-view that 
will influence the corporate governance of innovation. 
 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the separation of ownership and 
management results in information asymmetries and the assumption that decision-
making is based on self-interest and personal preferences, which increases costs 
associated with monitoring by the principals (owners). Jenson and Meckling (1976) 
argued that in cases where ownership and management are unified, the “principal-
agent” agency cost will be avoided. Family business researchers challenge 
assumptions made by Jenson and Meckling (1976) by claiming that altruistic and 
relational aspects of family firms have not been considered (Nordqvist et al., 2015; 
Kallmuenzer, 2015).  
 




Schulze et al. (2001) were among the first researchers to argue that family 
firms entail several potential sources of agency costs arising from altruism and self-
control. Schulze et al. (2001) defined altruism as “a trait that positively links the 
welfare of an individual to the welfare of others” (Schulze et al., 2001, p. 102). The 
family dynamics in family firms drive a different set of agency costs that is not 
solely financially motivated. Self-control problems may occur in the form of family 
members exploiting the generosity of family owners’ managers, family owner 
managers less stringently appraising family members’ job performance or the 
tendency to employ a family member over more qualified managers (Kallmuenzer, 
2015).  
 
The governance structure of family firms is differentiated from that of non-
family firms resulting from the unification of ownership and control. Carney (2005) 
posits that the family’s control over a firm’s organisational authority generates three 
dominant propensities: parsimony, personalism and particularism. Parsimony 
observed in family firms is an outcome of the alignment of owner-managers’ 
interests which thereby reduces opportunism and increases prudency in resource 
deployment and conservation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). De Massis et al. (2015) 
posit that family firms are expected to more prudently manage the product 
innovation process as such strategic decisions involve a family’s personal wealth. 
Personalism is rooted in the unification of ownership and management in family 
firms that grants significant power and legitimacy to family members in the 
organisation. De Massis et al. (2015, p. 4) propose that personalism results in 
“agents involved in product innovation process to be exempted from the internal 
bureaucratic constraints and strictly formalized management practices that limit 




managerial authority and inhibit ownership priorities in nonfamily firms”. 
Particularism stems from the fact that family members may pursue goals beyond 
financial objectives with the personalistic exercise of authority (Chrisman et al., 
2012). The parsimony, personalism and particularism propensity of family firms 
will likely influence the innovation governance model as well as the roles that the 
board of directors should play in a family-controlled firm.  
 
Another form of agency cost in family firms is the “principal-principal” 
agency cost that arises due to the misalignment of interests between majority and 
minority shareholders (Porta et al., 1999; Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Innovation 
investment is a long-term strategy that requires the commitment of the organisation 
from the board to top management teams. In governing the success of innovation 
strategy, the process in which such conflicts can be managed as well as processes 
to ensure proper decision-making at the board level are critical.  
 
The agency theory in the family business context supports our research 
direction in that innovation governance in family firms must be investigated while 
incorporating factors unique to family business dynamics beyond financial factors. 
Our research attempts to uncover how the agency theory will function in the 
innovation governance context of Singapore Chinese family businesses.  
 
2.2.2 Behavioural Agency Model  
 
According to Cyert and March (1963), the process of decision-making in 
organisations may be analysed in terms of “the variables that affect organisational 




goals, the variables that affect organisational expectations, and the variables that 
affect organisational choices” (Cyert & March, 1963, p. 162). They (Cyert & March, 
1963) developed “A Behavioral Theory of the Firm” (BTOF) that predicts and 
explains the determinants of organisational goals, aspirations and the factors 
influencing organisational strategic behaviour towards risk-taking. 
 
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) expanded on behavioural theory and 
agency theory and constructed a new theoretical model called the “behavioural 
agency model” (BAM). They suggested that executives may exhibit risk-seeking 
as well as risk-averse behaviour (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) depending on 
the context (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). They further established that strategic 
decisions are ‘reference dependent’ and that decision makers are primarily “loss 
averse” (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). ‘Reference dependent’ means that 
decision-makers will choose the option that provides the optimal outcome with 
respect to their current wealth. ‘Loss averse’ refers to when the decision-maker 
favours options that avoid loss of their current wealth over options that optimise 
future wealth (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). In the context of family businesses, 
‘wealth’ includes socio-economic wealth as well as financial wealth. Gomez-Mejia 
et al. (2007) posit that in family firms, socioemotional wealth (SEW)—defined as 
“non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the family’s affective needs, such as 
identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the perpetuation of the family 
dynasty” (p. 106)—represents a key variable that affects the decision-making 
process. Berrone et al. (2012) suggested five measurable dimensions of SEW 
termed as “FIBER”: Family control and influence, Identification with the firm, 




Binding social ties, Emotional attachment and Renewal of family bonds to the firm 
through dynastic succession.  
 
Mazzelli (2015) noted that behavioural theory and particularly BAM have 
become dominant paradigms for understanding the ways in which family business 
organisations make decisions. The dynamics of how family firms determine 
aspiration goals and drive search processes to meet the goals impact the process of 
innovation governance. The established aspiration goals are influenced by the desire 
of family firms to preserve its SEW beyond merely financial considerations. In 
family business research, the BAM advises regarding the aspects of decision-
making behaviour of family members that are influenced by their ‘reference point’ 
in terms of their current wealth (including SEW), their loss-averse disposition as 
well as the desire to have a ‘mixed gamble’ to hedge their options.  
 
Our research investigates whether BAM explains the behaviour of 
Singapore Chinese family leaders in innovation investment decisions. 
 
2.2.3 Stewardship Theory 
 
 Stewardship theory builds on a contrasting view of human behaviour 
compared to agency theory. The stewardship perspective assumes that man is driven 
by higher-level needs such as self-actualisation, social contribution, loyalty, 
generosity and intrinsic needs tied to personal motivations (Davis, Schoorman & 
Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson, 1990). Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) 
proposed that stewardship orientation regards individuals who are self-motivated 




and driven by the success of the collective organisation, which builds an 
environment of elevated trust.  
 
 In family firms with unified roles of owners and managers, we argue that 
there is a higher propensity towards a stewardship orientation due to an intrinsic 
trust environment among the family members as well as the alignment of 
organisational success that contributes to personal wealth. Miller, Le Breton‐Miller 
and Scholnick (2008) propose that family firm leaders exhibit three forms of 
stewardship leadership. Firstly, they invest in building the business for the long-run 
benefit of various family members, ensuring longevity of the business. They further 
posit that due to the firm leaders’ focus on longevity of their family business, they 
exhibit stewardship leadership by nurturing motivated, well-trained and loyal 
employees with a community culture. The third stewardship trait of family business 
leaders regards their focus on creating strong connections with outside stakeholders 
who can sustain the business in times of trouble (Miller, Le Breton‐Miller & 
Scholnick, 2008).  
 
Stewardship theory explains the unique traits of family businesses in terms 
of their long-termism and focus on relationships. In the area of innovation 
governance, long-termism is a possible antecedent to family leaders’ commitment 
to driving innovation, and the focus on relationship-building possibly positively 
influences fostering an innovation culture in the organisation.  
 




Our research examines whether Singapore Chinese family leaders exhibit 
stewardship leadership traits and whether these traits impact the structure of 
corporate governance of innovation.  
 
2.2.4 Resource-based View 
 
Presented by Penrose in 1959, the book “The Theory of the Growth of the 
Firm” is regarded by many scholars as the intellectual foundation for the modern 
resource-based-view (RBV). Penrose (1959) submitted the idea that the firm is a 
pool of interchangeable resources that are organised in an administrative framework. 
Barney (1991) is often regarded as the first scholar who formalised RBV into a 
theoretical framework (Hansson, 2015; Newbert, 2007). Barney (1991) posited that 
by accumulating resources that are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable 
(VRIN), a competitive advantage can be established by the firm. Firms that can 
develop valuable resources or capabilities that cannot be easily imitated or 
substituted by competitors are able to outperform them (Teece et al., 1997). 
Building on the RBV, Habbershon and Williams (1999) established a “familiness” 
model for assessing the competitive advantage of family firms. They described 
family business resources as “familiness” which is defined as “the bundle of 
resources that are distinctive to a firm as a result of family involvement” 
(Habbershon & Williams, 1999, p. 1). Family firms are unique due to the interaction 
between the family unit, the business entity and individual family members 
(Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Habbershon, Williams & Macmillan, 2003). The 
“familiness” RBV model (Habbershon & Williams, 1999) provides researchers a 




means to assess the behavioural social phenomena within family firms as well as 
the possible translation into the family firm’s unique competitive advantage.  
 
The effective management of “familiness” resources (social capital, human 
capital, patient capital and survivability capital, governance structure attribute) has 
been found to create competitive advantages and leads to wealth creation for family 
firms (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Social capital regards the resources embedded in the 
relationships among people (Hoffman, Hoelscher & Sorenson, 2006). Sirmon and 
Hitt (2003) described social capital as being composed of three dimensions: 
structural, cognitive and relational. They defined structural components as the social 
capital derived from network ties and configurations. The cognitive dimension is 
based on shared language and narratives while the relational dimension is based on 
trust, norms and obligations (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). The unique “familiness” 
resource of social capital in family firms, where the shared language among family 
members simplifies communication and the trust network facilitates collaboration, 
entails positive effects on the product innovation process (De Massis et al., 2015).  
 
Human capital is defined as the acquired knowledge, skills and capabilities 
of a person that allow for unique and novel actions (Coleman, 1988). Horton (1986) 
associates family firms’ human capital with positive attributes such as high 
commitment, friendliness and close relationships. Firm-specific tacit knowledge 
that is difficult to codify has the potential to be transferred through early exposure 
and involvement of children in the family firm through direct exposure and 
experience (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). However, many scholars have also cited 
negative human capital attributes associated with family firms such as hiring 




suboptimal employees due to the goal of employing family members (Miller, Le 
Breton‐Miller & Scholnick, 2008) as well as the lack of access to qualified human 
capital (Carney, 1998).  
 
Patient financial capital is financial capital that is invested without threat of 
liquidation over long periods (Dobrzynski, 1993). As Dreux (1990) highlighted, 
family firms generally face less pressure to achieve short-term results compared to 
nonfamily firms and hence have a longer time horizon for investment. Such a long-
term view of investment will also impact the funding of product innovation projects 
(De Massis et al., 2015).  
 
Sirmon and Hitt (2003) define survivability capital as “the pooled personal 
resources that family members are willing to loan, contribute, or share for the 
benefit of the family business”. This is unique to family firms due to the duality of 
family and business relationships (Dreux, 1990; Horton, 1986). Survivability 
capital represents a unique advantage that family firms can draw upon during 
difficult economic times to ensure survival.  
 
The RBV model in family business research provides a framework that 
guides clarity in seeking relationships among firm-level processes, assets, strategy 
and performance. Our study investigates whether the “familiness” model of RBV is 
aligned with our research findings for the corporate governance of innovation in 
Singapore Chinese business firms.  
 




2.3 Family Firm and Corporate Governance of Innovation 
 
According to a report published by NUS Business School, Centre for 
Governance, Institutions and Organisations (Dieleman, Shirm & Ibrahim, 2013), 
60.8% of the firms listed on the Singapore stock exchange are family firms. Family 
firms here are defined as companies in which “(co-)founders or their family 
members are present among the 20 largest shareholders or as board members” 
(Dieleman et al., 2013, p. 7). The research found that “founders and their family 
members occupy the most important leadership roles in the boards” of family firms 
(Dieleman et al., 2013, p. 16) with Chairman and CEO positions typically held by 
the founder or family members of the founder.  
 
Gerserk (1997) described the uniqueness of family businesses using a three-
circle model where the business, the family and the owner intersect and play 
different roles at different times depending on the circle they occupy at that moment. 
Habbershon, Williams and Macmillan (2003) indicate that in family firms, 
performance outcomes are impacted by the interaction of these three components, 
creating unique systemic conditions and constituencies. Family business 
researchers have also found differences with respect to the organisational goals 
pursued, risks taken and the investment horizon between family and non-family 
firms, which are all determinants of innovation activities (Chrisma et al., 2012; 
Chrisma et al., 2015; Zellweger, 2007; Zellweger et al., 2012). A detailed analysis 
of extant literature on technological innovation and family firms performed by De 
Massis et al. (2013) found that family involvement directly affects innovation inputs, 




activities and outputs. While some of the characteristics of family businesses are 
considered to be favourable to innovation, others seem to have the opposite effect. 
 
 Empirical studies by scholars have found that family firms have lower 
investment in technology innovation compared to non-family firms (De Massis et 
al., 2013; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Miller et al., 2011). Miller (2011) argued that 
family firms are not keen on R&D-intensive innovation strategies due to their risk 
aversion. Duran, Kammerlander, Van Essen and Zellweger (2015) conducted a 
meta-analysis based on 108 primary studies and concluded that while family firms 
invest less in innovation, they have achieved a higher conversion rate of innovation 
input into output.  
 
The innovation process and the antecedents to its effectiveness have been of 
great interest to family business scholars. Chrisma et al. (2015) devised a framework 
to explain the influence of family involvement on innovation management based on 
two key parameters: ability to innovate (discretion to act) and willingness to 
innovate (disposition to act). The long-term orientation, long-term leader tenures, 
tacit knowledge, strong family bonds and social networks of family firms contribute 
to their enhanced ability to innovate. Their willingness to innovate is heavily 
influenced by family owners’ goals, intentions and motivations as well as 
socioemotional concerns (Chrisma et al., 2015; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Röd 
(2016) conducted an in-depth analysis of 78 empirical studies on innovation in 
family businesses and developed a conceptual framework that illustrates the various 
family factors that impact the various stages of family firms’ innovation processes. 
He posits that the impact on the innovation behaviour of the business can be positive 




or negative depending on the familiness of the firm as well as contextual factors 
such as generational effects and type of family involvements.  
 
Other studies show a positive link between new product or service 
introduction and family involvement. Gudmundson and Hartman (2003) posit that 
the initiation and implementation of innovation are related to aspects of culture and 
structure. Family businesses were found to have unique characteristics positively 
related to implementation (Gudmundson & Hartman, 2003). Liang et al. (2013) 
suggest that the family involvement in boards strengthens the positive relationship 
between R&D investment and innovation performance, whereas family 
involvement in management teams tends to weaken this relationship. 
 
While there is extant literature on the effect of family involvement in the 
innovation management process, research into the corporate governance of 
innovation in family businesses is at its nascent stage. Family businesses are unique 
regarding the intersection among the three circles that Gerserk (1997) described: 
the business, family and owner. Some family firm attributes provide advantages in 
the innovation process while others may function as inhibitors. By providing clarity 
concerning the corporate governance of innovation in family businesses, family 
firms can become more aware of the various factors they can leverage or control at 
different phases of business development.  
 
Our research examines three components of the proposed model of 
corporate governance of innovation: innovation strategy (why, where, when, how, 
what), control (who, how much), and monitor (outcome measurement). These foci 




provide a unique contribution to the knowledge of corporate governance of 








CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN, RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 Research Design 
 
Our aim is to develop a model of corporate governance of innovation for 
Singapore Chinese family businesses. For this purpose, we conducted a qualitative 
study to better understand the under-explored dynamics of corporate governance of 
innovation in Chinese family firms. In this research, we adopt the common 
definition of family business as “firms with substantial presence by the founder 
or the founder’s relatives as owners and/or acting in leadership roles” 
(Dieleman, 2018; Duran et al., 2015; König et al., 2013). This study adopts a 
grounded theory approach to study the dynamics of corporate governance of 
innovation in Chinese family firms.  
 
This study attempts to contribute to the literature regarding corporate 
governance of innovation in Singapore Chinese family firms through the following 
research questions: 
 
• What is the role of the board in the corporate governance of innovation in 
Singapore Chinese family firms? 
 
• How does family influence affect the corporate governance of innovation in 
Singapore Chinese family firms? 
 
• What are the key constructs of the corporate governance of innovation 
model for Singapore Chinese family firms?  





3.1.1 Case-study Approach 
 
 
A case-study approach is used as we seek clarity concerning the “why” and 
“how” behind the innovation governance process of Chinese family businesses, 
since case-study approaches have been found to be suitable for providing 
explanations rather than statistical information (Eisenhardt, 1983). A multiple-case 
study (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Yin, 1994) on four Singapore Chinese family 
businesses was conducted to elucidate innovation governance in Chinese family 
businesses. A grounded-theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) approach was used in the 
case studies. "Grounded theory" is defined as "the discovery of theory from data – 
systematically obtained and analysed in social research" (Glaser & Strauss 1967, p. 
1). Urquhart (2013) tabulated the different grounded-theory method coding 
procedures and described the originally proposed methods shared by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) by comparing incidents applicable to each category, integrating 
categories and their properties, delimiting the theory and writing the theory. 
Eisenhardt (1983) found the case-study method to be especially relevant in research 
where the scholar seeks new insights and theory. The process is iterative and tightly 
linked to data and delivers theory that is often “novel, testable and empirically valid” 
(Eisenhardt, 1983, p. 532). 
 
This study is divided into two phases. In phase 1, we conducted interviews 
with ten experts in the areas of innovation and governance. Seven out of the ten 
interviewees have been or are currently a board member. A semi-structured 
questionnaire for the expert interviews was developed based on literature reviews 
of the current body of knowledge on innovation governance and the dynamics of 




family firms (Appendix A). Data collected from phase 1 were analysed and the 
outcome was considered for our design of phase 2 interview questions for the case 
study research. 
 
When selecting cases, Eisenhardt (1989) posits that qualitative samples 
should be purposive rather than random. Cases should be selected so that they are 
likely to replicate or extend the theory. Following this principle of selection, we 
chose our four family firms for the case-study research based on the following 
criteria: 
 
• Ownership majority was held by members belonging to founder’s 
family of Chinese heritage 
• Owner or at least one of owner’s family members is involved as a 
key management executive in the business operation 
• Recognised by the industry as an innovative firm (i.e., obtained 
industry awards and/or is perceived as an industry leader) 
 
 
The intent to create clear selection criteria is to ensure that the cases selected 
correspond to the research questions under investigation.  
 
3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
 
Using the qualitative data analysis program Nvivo (QSR International, 
Version 12.1.0), we coded and iteratively analysed the qualitative data by 
alternating between the data and an emerging structure of theoretical arguments that 




corresponded to the research questions that we are focusing on. We used the three 
key steps described by Locke (2001): creating first-order codes, integrating first-
order codes into second-order themes and delimiting the theory by aggregating 
theoretical dimensions. Figures 1 and 3 summarise the process and show the first-
order codes, second-order categories and aggregate theoretical dimensions for 
phase 1 and phase 2 data collected respectively.  
 
3.3 Phase 1: Expert Interviews 
 
In phase 1 of the research we conducted ten interviews with experts in the 
areas of innovation and governance. The profiles of the experts interviewed are 
displayed in Table 1. Eight of the ten interviews were conducted face-to-face while 
two were via Skype call. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed 
using grounded-theory methodology. We used a qualitative data analysis program 






Table 1: Profile of Experts Interviewed in Phase 1 
 
 Designation Gender Organisation Remarks 
1. Managing Director 
 
Female Fortune 500 global management consulting 
and professional services firm that provides 
strategy, consulting, digital, technology and 
operations services  
Seasoned strategist and collaborative leader 
with over 20 years of experience across 
industries globally. Specialises in the areas 
of business model innovation, corporate 
strategy and leadership 
2. Chairman Male National association of company directors 
 
Independent board member of several listed 
and non-listed companies and non-profit 
organisations. Author of three books on 
social sector and change. Former managing 
director of global consulting firm 
3. Managing Director, 
Asia Pacific 
Male Management consulting firm advising 
enterprises on business strategy founded in 
2000 by Harvard Business School professor 
 
Strategic advisor, writer and speaker on 
topics of growth and innovation. Current 
board member of a government-linked 
media company 
4. Chief Innovation 
Officer 
Male One of the largest global providers of 
insurance, annuities and employee benefit 
programs 
 
Independent board member of a Singapore 
statutory board. Former Chief Strategist 
Officer of a large Singapore listed company 
5. Former President Male University in Singapore  Independent board member of a French 
software company 
  




 Designation Gender Organization Remarks 
6. Strategy Professor  Female Ivy League Business School in the US Globally recognised expert on strategy, 
innovation and growth with an emphasis on 
corporate entrepreneurship. Recognised as 
top 10 management thinkers by global 
management award “Thinkers50” for two 
years. One of the most widely published 
authors in the Harvard Business Review and 
author of best-selling book 
7. CEO & Founder, 
Innovation 
Consultant 
Male Training and consultancy firm founded in 
2014 focusing on innovation measurement 
and benchmarking with headquarters in 
Sweden 
Launched 10 start-ups as well as acquired, 
turned around and sold more than 30 SMEs 
in Europe. Awarded Global Top 100 CEO 
by CEO Monthly in 2018 
 
8. Associate Professor Male University in Singapore 
 
Director of Centre for Governance, 
Institutions & Organisations 
9. Associate Professor 
(Practice Track) 
Female University in Singapore 
 
Scientific panel member of “The 
International Society for Professional 
Innovation Management” (ISPIM), advisor 
to Singapore university’s lean 
transformation centre 
10. Professor emeritus 
of technology and 
innovation 
management 
Male Business school located in Lausanne, 
Switzerland 
 
40 years of hands-on top management 
consulting and teaching experience with 
multinational corporations throughout 
Europe, USA and Asia. Coach to several 





The experts were interviewed based on the questionnaire in Appendix A that 
covers the roles that boards should play in the corporate governance of innovation, 
the scope that should be included and the drivers behind the proactiveness of boards 
in governing innovation. Figure 1 shows the theme and theoretical dimensions that 
emerged from our phase 1 interviews.  
 
Figure 1: Overview of Data Construct from Phase 1 Expert Interviews 
 
 




We discuss the factors that affect the board’s focus on the corporate governance 
of innovation in Section 3.3.1 and examine the roles and responsibilities of the 
different stakeholders: board members, top management team and family members 
involved in Sections 3.3.2 to 3.3.4. In Section 3.3.5, we crystallise our phase 1 
research findings using a model that illustrates the different constructs of the 
corporate governance of innovation at the board level. The findings from phase 1 
will be incorporated into our recommended checklist for CGOI for Singapore 
Chinese family firms. 
 
3.3.1 Factors Affecting the Board’s Proactiveness in Governing Innovation 
 
 
A shared view of the interviewees is that while innovation is deemed of great 
importance to the sustainable growth of an organisation, the board of directors 
(BODs) does not actively drive innovation governance. The key reasons behind this 
view which surfaced from the interviews can be grouped into three key observations:  
 
• BODs focus on risk of commission and not risk of omission  
• Absence of board member with innovation management competency and 
experience 
• Lack of shareholder pressure on the board to govern innovation  
 
We study each of these observations that lead to our propositions regarding the 










• BODs focus on risk of commission and not risk of omission 
 
The board is responsible for ensuring conformance as well as performance 
of the firm. The monitoring role of the board is clear with compliance and regulatory 
aspects of work that must be fulfilled. Experts interviewed observed that the board 
of directors are overwhelmed with governance-focused tasks which also drive 
their risk-averse mindset: 
 
“What typically happens is that today's organisations govern and operate, 
overwhelm the time, effort and activity of both the board and the senior 
management team.” Chief Innovation Officer, Global Insurance Services Provider  
 
“The agenda is getting more and more crowded. And I suppose innovation is 
another entity that tries to make its way into the board; In my opinion, the boards 
these days are just too risk adverse. And because of new regulation, new 
compliance requirement, it pushes them into an even more inward looking, risk 
avoidance mentality.” Associate Professor cum Director of Centre for Governance, 
Institutions & Organisations, University in Singapore  
 
“I think a big part of the choices we see boards making is very risk focused. If you 
think about leaders and their leadership, it's a very difficult balancing act around 
managing risk. Risk of the future versus navigating for the present, and often boards 
and leadership are held accountable if you have done something that's risky, but 
you're never held accountable if you miss an opportunity. They should be thinking 
about how do you future-proof an organization. But what they wind up doing is risk, 




and we can understand why.” Managing Director, Fortune 500 global management 
consulting and professional services firm 
 
“Boards very often look at internal risk of projects, but they don't look so much at 
external risk of disruption. A typical audit committee will look at all the risks in the 
financial terms and sometimes political risks, but they don't look at disruption risk.” 
Professor emeritus of technology and innovation management, Business education 
school, Switzerland 
 
Observation 1:  
 
Regulation and compliance requirements drive the board to be risk adverse, 
thus prioritising board agenda towards risk avoidance over pre-emption of 
future risk of disruption or displacement. 
 
 Matters which are immediate and urgent are always prioritised over those 
which are critical but not urgent. Regulations and compliance matters occupy most 
of the board’s attention.  Without a clear board mandate to drive the corporate 
governance of innovation, innovation will lack inclusion in the already-crowded 









• Absence of board members with innovation management competency 
and experience 
 
Most board members are chosen based on their experience in large 
organisations, mostly from mature industries. The lack of suitable candidates at the 
board level who can effectively drive the discussion of innovation strategy 
represents a key impediment to the board's pro-activeness in driving an innovation 
governance agenda. 
 
This problem begins with how board members are selected. One interviewee 
pointed out the issue concerning the appointment of board members by owners who 
chose people they trusted to represent their stance rather than from a competency-
composition perspective: 
 
"And that is a problem because you recruit board to represent the owners. And you 
put people now that you have faith in as an owner. ‘Will you protect my ownership? 
Will you take my standpoint?’ And you don't care about the composition of the 
board. That is a problem." CEO & Founder, Innovation consultancy and Training 
firm headquarters in Sweden 
 
The intent is to choose board representatives who can protect the owners’ 
interests. Even when the selection of board members is based on competency, the 
focus is often on professional competencies such as financial and legal and has 
nothing to do with innovation: 
 




"I think that we have boards, which are composed of very capable, competent 
people, but who are chosen for competencies that have nothing to do with 
innovation. They're chosen for their legal competencies, for their financial and 
audits competencies, but not necessarily for a deeper understanding of the 
industry." Former President, University in Singapore cum independent Board 
Member of a Global French software company 
 
When more closely examining the types of board members that will be 
valuable to driving the corporate governance of innovation, relevant experience and 
expertise in innovation management come into focus: 
 
“In some respect, that concept of having a diverse board with one or two people 
who understand the impact of, in this case, digital disruption, and you could say 
innovation, to respond innovatively on the board, helps the board to be more biased 
towards ensuring that boards are responsive to the needs of the digital era." 
Chairman, National association of company directors 
  
The board can also close the skill-set gaps through the formulation of a 
“technology advisory council”: 
 
“The critical issue is, how open and how aware is the management team of what's 
going on? The role of technology advisory councils is to make sure ... sometimes, 
you have, I know that some pharma companies have some Nobel prizes recipients, 
as part of that technology advisory committee simply just to make sure that they 
have the best knowledge in that advisory committee because they feel things are 




changing so fast that unless they have some very talented people in their advisory 
committee, they might miss some big trends.“ Professor emeritus of technology and 
innovation management, Business education school, Switzerland 
 
A key finding regards the knowledge gap in innovation management that 
hinders the board from being effective or even aware of their roles and 
responsibilities in making innovation strategy decisions: 
 
 "I think both boards and management suffer from a lack of clarity in terms of what 
it takes to be innovative. I think that misunderstanding is everywhere. What people 
don't understand is it's not just about getting great ideas, it's about the ideation of 
great ideas, and then incubation, turning them into something that could be 
marketed. And I think that's a fundamental misunderstanding across both 
management and board level on those three processes." Strategy Professor, Ivy 




The nomination criteria of board members, centred on traditional professional 
expertise, lead to a lack of innovation experts on the board who can effectively 
drive the innovation governance agenda.  
 
The board has a clearly critical role regarding the corporate governance of 
the organisation. However, the focus of the board has been on risk management, 
hence the observed dominance of board members with professional expertise in 




legal and finance areas. There is a need for board diversity in order to include board 
members with innovation management expertise and experience who can 
effectively drive the corporate governance of innovation. 
 
 
• Lack of shareholder pressure on the board to govern innovation  
 
 
It is simple to measure what has been accomplished but not opportunities 
missed. There is a lack of motivation for the board to drive innovation investment 
that is deemed high risk compared to established businesses. There is also 
insufficient shareholder pressure on the board to drive governance of innovation.  
 
The board is expected to monitor the performance of the firm, and in the 
case of a publicly listed company the performance-monitoring portion may be 
short-term. As the interviewees shared, boards still function in a "business-as-usual" 
mode of operation: 
 
 "Well, I think the fact is it’s business-as-usual. If you had a competitive advantage 
that you've been exploiting for a long time, then to do something different is a real 
change. And I think a lot of boards are still coasting on the business-as-usual 
framework. The penalisation for missing an opportunity is almost very small versus 
the penalisation for having missed a risk." Strategy Professor, Ivy League Business 
School in the US 
 




There is no incentive for the board to drive innovation that is deemed 
"unpredictable" and “riskier”. It is also considered challenging to monitor the 
performance of the board in governing innovation investment, which one 
interviewee described as the "sin of omission" versus "sin of commission": 
 
"I think it's always easier to measure sins of commission. We do something that 
goes wrong, and we measure that. Versus sins of omission, which is an opportunity 
we should've taken advantage of that we didn't. It's a very difficult balancing act 
around managing risk. Risk of the future versus navigating for the present, and 
often boards and leadership are held accountable if you have done something that's 
risky, but you're never held accountable if you miss an opportunity." Strategy 
Professor, Ivy League Business School in the US 
 
“It's invisible 'til something horribly goes wrong, and then you're caught because 
you didn't think about a risk and it had left you vulnerable. However, if there was 
an opportunity, unless it was all the way like Kodak, but you missed it and you catch 
up, you're not penalised. So, if you think about how boards are rewarded and you 
think about how leadership is rewarded... you know, the penalisation for missing 
an opportunity is almost very small versus the penalisation for having missed a risk.” 












There is a lack of shareholder pressure on the board to drive innovation, and 
the performance of the board is still measured based on current business-as-
usual operational risks. 
 
 The board’s behaviour is shaped by the expectation of the shareholders. The 
current reward system for the board is still centred on operational risk and short-
term financial performance. For the board to shift focus toward the corporate 
governance of innovation, shareholders’ expectations must be aligned.  
 
 Considering this understanding of antecedents to the board’s focus on the 
corporate governance of innovation, our research delves deeper into the scope of 
corporate governance that should be driven by the board. 
 
3.3.2 Desired Governance of Innovation at the Board Level 
 
Innovation strategy is part of broader corporate strategy. Researchers have long 
debated about the role of the board of directors regarding firm strategy (Hendry & 
Kiel, 2004; Schmidt & Brauer, 2006; Zahra & Pearce, 1990). When focusing on the 
aspect of innovation, a significant void in both academic research and practice 
surfaced regarding the board’s role and how the governance process should be 
conducted. The interviewees mentioned the need for the board process to include: 
 




• Review and approve innovation strategy: Why, What, Where, When, 
Who, How 
 
The board has a “fundamental responsibility”, as cited by one interviewee, to 
govern innovation in order to ensure survivability of the firm and to establish a clear 
direction for the organisation: 
 
“Innovation comes in because it can really disrupt products and market. That 
means the very survival, not just whether the firm is thriving. The very survivability. 
And in that context, I think the board will have a most fundamental responsibility. 
I think the board must play a very big role but not in the sense that they should 
decide what's R&D expenses, what is the direction of R&D, or where do you locate 
them. But more so the broader directions of how innovation would redefine your 
business. What kind of innovation out there is threatening your business?” 
Associate Professor cum Director of Centre for Governance, Institutions & 
Organisations., University in Singapore  
 
This may include “auditing” the company’s current state of innovation: 
 
“Auditing if you wish the capabilities of the company to follow the new technologies 
and new trends, etc. Some do have a technology advisory committee which basically 
tells them what's the state of the art in the industry or in their world and whether 
they are adequate. So, it is part of the board duties in my opinion to do some 
auditing of the capabilities and the understanding of the company.” Professor 




emeritus of technology and innovation management, Business education school, 
Switzerland 
 
Besides providing clarity concerning the “why”, the board is also expected to 
clearly establish the direction for “What does success look like?”. The ability to 
state the goal the organisation desires from the innovation investment represents an 
important component of the governance process. The board delivers its value by 
questioning the proposed innovation strategy by the management team and thus 
"elevate the conversation", as shared by one interviewee. A key aspect of reviewing 
and approving the strategy for innovation includes determining the end state that 
the organisation desires: 
 
“I am of the opinion that, when they talk about strategy, I have to set some targets 
in terms of what you want to achieve in innovation. In particular, I always asked 
myself the question how much revenue should come from products that have been 
launched, or services that have been launched the last X years, X being a little bit 
dependent on the industry because it depends on the life cycles of the product.” 
Former President, University in Singapore cum independent Board Member of a 
Global French software company 
 
There is a need to ensure that the board has a process to provide clear 
directions for innovation investment and control mechanisms: 
 
“The board can no longer take a back-seat role. They do need to put in place 
certain processes to ensure that there is some form of control. Because I think 




governance by itself also has an element of control as well. But these control 
processes should not stifle innovation. That is more for accountability. The Board, 
at first, are expected to give high level directions and guidance when it comes to 
strategy objectives and giving rather broad guidelines in terms of quantum of 
return on investment, with a broad range on what are the return of investment; 
while understanding that there...given a portfolio of different investments, assets 
and investment plans, you probably need to have a range of ROIs. But without 
giving very specific operational details.” Associate Professor (Practice Track), 
University in Singapore 
 
The board’s role is to ensure the appropriate conversation occurs at board 
meetings with the top management team in order to align the strategic direction for 
the organisation concerning its innovation investment and management. The board 
agenda should include strategic review and approval of the management’s proposed 
innovation strategy as well as execution plans with clarity in terms of: why innovate, 
where to innovate, how to innovate, how much to invest in innovation and with 
whom to innovate.  
 
 
• Control of resources 
 
The board must ensure that the correct resources are allocated where innovation 
matters. This includes its role to appoint the appropriate leadership at the top that 
can fulfil the approved innovation strategy. 
 




"Appointing top management with innovation focus, it's the board that needs to do 
that." Former President, University in Singapore cum independent Board Member 
of a Global French software company 
 
Control of resources also includes the decision of how much to invest in 
innovation. 
 
“The board needs to be involved in the resource allocation process, I think that's 
one of the key areas, which is making sure that management is allocating adequate 
resources to investment for the future. I think that's a huge part of where the board 
needs to be involved.” Strategy Professor, Ivy League Business School in the US 
 
As several interviewees pointed out, providing a clear portfolio may 
represent a means to achieve the desired clarity for monitoring: 
 
"I have advised colleagues to have a clear dashboard about innovation 
performance. I refer to the number of new products as a percentage of the overall 
revenue. I think you also have to have some indicator of the pipeline of new products 
or new systems. In that pipeline, where the different projects are in different stages. 
I don't think that is for the board to judge the individual projects, but to look at 
whether the portfolio is a healthy portfolio." Former President, University in 
Singapore cum independent Board Member of a Global French software company 
 
As part of the corporate governance of innovation, the board must be mindful 
about the selection of C-suites that can drive the approved innovation strategy. 




Besides appointing the appropriate candidates to support the organisation’s 
innovation strategy, the board must control resources in terms of investment into 
innovation. Viewing portfolios represents a possible approach that provides the 
board an opportunity to monitor whether the organisation’s investment into 
innovation is adequate for future growth. 
 
• Monitoring of outcome and performance 
 
The board's role also includes monitoring the performance of the management 
team in executing the agreed strategy. It is difficult to measure innovation 
performance however, which is why we rarely observe the board measuring the 
innovation performance of the C-suite. 
 
“Boards do not measure innovation performance. First because it is difficult to 
measure innovation performance, you have to measure input and output and very 
often more than financial performance. But the innovation performance for 
example, how many patents the company will be creating, how well protected it will 
be—quite a lot of performance measures. And it's important also that they should 
give the CEO some targets regarding innovation performance.” Professor emeritus 
of technology and innovation management, Business education school, Switzerland 
 
For innovation, the outcome must be measured differently: 
 
"One way to evaluate, from a board perspective, from a monitoring perspective, is 
as follows: If you look at a management team, or the CEO herself, the question to 




ask isn't, ‘Did she hit her numbers?’ The question to ask is, ‘Over her five-year 
tenure, did she leave the company in better competitive shape, and a better strategic 
position, a better posture, than when she joined?’" Chief Innovation Officer, Global 
Insurance Services Provider  
 
 It is always easier to measure the “sin of commission” compared to the “sin 
of omission”: 
 
“I think it's always easier to measure sins of commission. We do something that 
goes wrong and we measure that. Versus sins of omission, which is an opportunity 
we should've taken advantage of that we didn't.” Strategy Professor, Ivy League 
Business School in the US 
 
Hence, the board must ensure that they ask the correct questions with a focus 
on innovation, such as one suggested by an interviewee: 
 
"I would often ask a CEO how much of his or her portfolio of innovation projects 
were failing. If they answered me less than 40%, I would say you don't innovate." 
Former President, University in Singapore cum independent Board Member of a 
Global French software company 
 
 The board needs to monitor the executive team’s performance and outcome 
of innovation management. The measurement of performance can be achieved 
through establishing a “Key Performance Indicator” (KPI) for the CEO in terms of 
percentage of revenue generated from new products launched over the past two 




years, number of patents filed, measure of success for projects in innovation 
portfolios etc. The measures would differ across different industries and 
organisations. The board must incorporate such measurements to the CEO’s 
remuneration in order to drive the desired focus and behaviour.  
 
3.3.3 C-level Role in Innovation Management 
 
What distinguishes the roles of management from the board is that 
management is responsible to execute the approved strategies and to provide 
recommendations concerning what and how to innovate using their domain 
knowledge and entrenched roles in business operations. Hence, we describe the role 
of the C-level as innovation management since they must drive implementation of 
the strategies as well as the appropriate organisational structure and culture to 
achieve desired goals. The ability of the CEO to be ambidextrous and possesses the 
domain expertise necessary to determine the correct mix of innovation portfolios 
also surfaced in the interviews: 
 
“And in my view, if a C-level person doesn't know what they're doing, they shouldn't 
be in that role. That's just flat out, and it is a confidence thing. Like, CEO, she needs 
to go to her board and say, ‘We're applying this more like 60, 30, 10, and here's 
why. A lot of opportunities to differentiate, and here's the activities we're gonna go 
do.’" Chief Innovation Officer, Global Insurance Services Provider 
 
"CEOs of innovative organisations need to have two faces. They used a nice word, 
ambidextrous, but you basically need to be schizophrenic. One moment you have to 




say to this group, ‘You need to be as efficient as possible. I'm going to take away 
resources, and you will need to increase productivity.’ Then, turn to another person 
and say, ‘Take your time. Be creative. Try out things. Experiment.’" Former 
President, University in Singapore cum independent Board Member of a Global 
French software company 
 
 While CEOs must embrace the responsibility to drive innovation outcomes 
in the organisation, the rest of the C-suites are equally important to ensuring the 
transformation of businesses: 
 
“Now, most Americans faculty look at the CEO. There’s always a CEO, CMO, CTO. 
My experience ... I've sort of 45 years of experience to show that CEO alone is 
insufficient. It's the entire C-Suite, the entire executive committee that must be 
adequately prepared to handle a transformation.” Professor emeritus of technology 
and innovation management, Business education school, Switzerland 
 
 Having the correct team of C-suites in place with the competency to drive 
innovation management aligned with the board’s mandate is key to the success of 
innovation investment (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010; Smith & Tushman, 2005). In the 
framework of innovation governance, we need to ensure clarity regarding “who” 
drives innovation and in “which area”. The importance of having the proper 
management team in place to drive innovation was emphasised by interviewees and 
is also aligned with the innovation governance models of Deschamps and Nelson 
(2014). The board must ensure the selected management team possesses the 




capability to drive the approved innovation strategy as well as the clarity of roles 
and responsibilities of each innovation driver. 
 
3.3.4 Family Involvement at the Board Level  
 
 Family involvement at the board level changes the dynamics of the board 
for governing innovation. The key difference seems to lie in the role of controlling 
family member, usually the Chairman and/or CEO of the organisation, who drives 
the innovation mandate from the board to the management level. The long-term 
view of family firms also means that the organisation can withstand short-term 
pressure for financial outcomes and can invest in a strategic future. Socio-emotional 
wealth (SEW) has long been recognised to be a key variable that affects decision-
making in family businesses (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Berrone et al., 2012). 
Family businesses are shown to employ a more long-term view compared to non-
family firms. With family members at the board level, decisions to invest in 
innovation, which typically require longer time frames to reap returns, can be 
executed rather swiftly:  
 
“In non-family boards, sometimes the problem they have is they are paralysed. 
Paralysis by analysis. They get too analytical and always due diligent, due process, 
until nothing happens…A lot of board members (non-family members) just have the 
mentality, I'm here three years, at most nine years. Whereas if you have family 
member executives, this business is for life.” Associate Professor cum Director of 
Centre for Governance, Institutions & Organisations, University in Singapore  
  




“I think for family business, the board (non-family members) may be less expected 
to hold a longer-term vision or to put in place in papers, because that is something 
that is really driven very much by the founder and the CEO and major shareholder. 
But for non-family business, I would say that in order for innovation to take place, 
then they can play a bigger role in setting the stage, the structure, and the 
environment to allow longer runway. The time you give for innovation to get started 
and to see results, to fail, and try other things. So that runway is something for 
boards to mandate.” Associate Professor (Practice Track), University in Singapore 
 
The family influence on how innovation governance occurs at the board 
level will be further explored in the case studies.  
 
  




3.3.5 Findings from Phase 1 Expert Interviews 
  
 From the expert interview data in phase 1, a model of corporate governance 
of innovation (CGOI) at the board level emerged, as shown in Figure 2 below.  
 
Figure 2: Corporate Governance of Innovation at the Board Level 
 
 Three key antecedents to proactiveness of the board in driving the corporate 
governance of innovation emerged from our phase 1 data analysis: 
 
• Board Agenda on Innovation  
 
Regulation and compliance requirements influence the board to be risk adverse 
and thus prioritise the board agenda towards risk avoidance over pre-emption of 
future risk of disruption or displacement. There is a need to ensure that innovation 
represents a key agenda in the board meeting. Board processes must be incorporated 




to ensure that board-level discussions occur concerning risk management of current 
projects as well as innovation investment for pre-emption of future risk of 
disruption. We posit that: 
 
Proposition 1:  
 
The more pronounced the innovation agenda enacted, the higher the 
motivation level of the board and management to make innovation work. 
 
 
• Innovation Expertise 
 
 
From the interview data collected, we observed that the nomination criteria of 
board members centre on traditional professional expertise, which leads to a lack of 
innovation experts on the board who can effectively drive the innovation 
governance agenda. This hinders the level of corporate governance of innovation 
that occurs at the board level. Hence, we posit that: 
 
 
Proposition 2:  
 
The greater the domain expertise and experience in innovation management 
at the board level, the more pronounced the firm’s corporate governance of 
innovation. 
 
There is a need to be mindful in the selection of board members in order to 
incorporate diversity of expertise in innovation management beyond professional 




expertise in functional areas such as finance, legal and industry domains. 
Incorporating board members with innovation management expertise will help to 
ensure a balanced board agenda with appropriate focus on the risks of disruption 
and displacement.  
 
 
• Shareholders’ Expectations 
 
Shareholders should expect the appointed board representatives to not only 
protect their interests in short-term decisions but to also employ a long-term strategy 
to ensure business sustainability and profitability, pre-empting disruption and 
displacement of business.  
 
Proposition 3:  
 
The greater the expectation of shareholders vis-à-vis organisational innovation 
outcomes, the higher the motivation level of the board in driving the corporate 
governance of innovation. 
 
 Shareholders should clearly articulate their expectations of the board in 
driving the innovation agenda. This will impact the board’s level of focus on the 
corporate governance of innovation at the organisational level. 
 
 The data collected from phase 1 expert interviews regarding the board’s 
roles and responsibilities in the corporate governance of innovation are aligned with 
Deschamps and Nelson’s (2014) proposed role of the board in governing innovation. 




There are three key areas that clearly fall under the roles and responsibilities of 
the board in governing innovation: 
 
• Review and approve the innovation strategy: why, what, where, when, who, 
how 
• Control of resources 
• Monitoring of innovation outcomes and performance of C-suite in the 
execution of innovation strategies 
 
These are distinct from the roles and responsibilities of the top management 
team in the organisation who drive the innovation strategy’s execution as well as 
the appropriate culture to achieve desired results. 
 
 Family involvement is observed to be a mediating factor that impacts the 
effectiveness of driving the corporate governance of innovation from the board 
level to innovation management at the executive level. The ways in which family 
involvement impacts the corporate governance of innovation will be further studied 
in phase 2, where we utilise case study research on four Chinese family firms in 
Singapore to develop a model that can inform both academics as well as 
practitioners. 
 
 The model proposed in Figure 2 provides clarity concerning the roles and 
responsibilities of the board in driving the corporate governance of innovation as 
well as the key antecedents to ensure their focus. The findings from phase 1 are 
incorporated into the checklist presented in Chapter 4. A comparison of the model 




with the roles and responsibility of the board in Chinese family firms is performed 
in Section 3.4.3, and recommendations are provided through the comparison. 
 
  
3.4 Phase 2: Case Study 
 
 In the phase 2 case study research, we seek to expand our understanding of 
the constructs of the corporate governance of innovation model in Singapore 
Chinese family businesses.  
 
3.4.1 Case Selection and Data Sources 
 
In order to explore the links between different perspectives of family 
influence on the corporate governance of innovation, we utilised a qualitative 
approach through case studies. For this case study approach, four Singapore family-
owned-and-controlled firms were selected that fulfilled the following three 
conditions: (1) Ownership majority was held by members belonging to founder’s 
family of ethnic Chinese heritage; (2) owner or at least one of owner’s family 
members is involved as a key management executive in the business operations and 
(3) recognised by the industry as innovative firms. The key parameters of the family 
firms are listed in Table 2.  
 
The research design relied on multiple sources of information comprised of 
interviews with C-suite-level company executives, annual reports, company 
websites and media releases as well as interviews. The primary data collection 
method used involved semi-structured interviews with C-suite-level company 




executives. The interview questionnaires are attached in Appendix B. The 
interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour, and all were conducted face-to-
face following the informed consent of the participant. The author voice-recorded 
all interviews and took notes. The audio recording was then transcribed verbatim.   
 
 For each case study, we provided a description of the background of the 
company as well as their organisational structure, innovation focus and current state 
of innovation governance. The current state of innovation governance is described 
based on Deschamps’s (2013) model of the scope of innovation governance: 
 
 
Figure 3: The Scope of Innovation Governance (Deschamps, 2013) 
 









Aquaculture Co. was incorporated in 1998 and has been listed on the 
Singapore Exchange since 2000. According to information from the company’s 
corporate website, it was established by two brothers, with one being the father of 
Aquaculture Co.’s current executive chairman and the other the father of its current 
deputy managing director. The company began as a pig farm and in 1985 was 
converted into a fish farm breeding guppies. It has since grown to become an 
integrated ornamental fish service provider engaged in business ranging from 
breeding, farming, and trading of over 1,000 species of ornamental fish to 
manufacturing and distribution of aquarium and pet accessories. The company 
garnered 52 awards since 2001 and is widely recognised for its corporate 
governance, transparency and innovation.  
 
• Company Structure 
 
Aquaculture Co. is a publicly listed company on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange (SGX). Based on the company’s 2017 financial report, about 44% of 
shares are owned by the family. The current family members involved in company 
operations comprise second- and third-generation family members. Two of the 
eight board members are family members while three out of the eight of the top 
management team are family members.  
 
• Innovation Focus 
 
Aquaculture Co. has strongly emphasised value creation and innovation, 
and it is the first company in Singapore in the ornamental fish industry that strived 




for ISO 9002 certification in 1996. According to the company’s Chairman cum 
Managing Director (MD), it started to innovate its internal processes in 1997 by 
semi-automating their packing processes during a time when most other fish farms 
still relied on manual processes: 
 
“But we semi-automated. We also integrated the weighing machine, computers and 
all these to generate packing orders or the invoice. We started the whole thing back 
in 1997. There was a government agency called Productivity Board which helped 
us”.  
 
 The Chairman of Aquaculture Co. regards technology as a key enabler of 
innovation in his company. Possessing a strong belief that technology is key to 
transforming the way they work, in 2009 he established an integrated R&D division 
to spearhead the firm’s research and development efforts (Menkhoff, 2018).  
 
“No matter what kind of new things you do, you have to involve technology. So, 
technology is something that I wanted to put in. Before I retire, I want people to 
call ‘Aquaculture Co.’ a technology company. Not a fish company because, 
regardless of what we do, we use technology to enable what we are doing”.  
 
A notable success due to Aquaculture Co.’s R&D efforts concerns a new 
filtration system that uses electrolytes to break down ammonia while retaining 
minerals. According to the General Manager of Aquaculture Co, the system was 
sold to other aquaponic farms and the Singapore Zoo as well. Besides technological 
innovation, the company is also venturing into adjacent industries and innovating 




around its business model. Leveraging its expertise with fish farming technology, 
it has now expanded into the edible fish business. 
 
 Innovation investment and strategy are driven by the C-suite at Aquaculture 
Co. The Chairman cum MD of Aquaculture Co. views the board of directors as 
advisors in specific domains such as legal, finance and technology. One board 
member is a professor at a Singapore university who specialised in aquaculture 
technology. The professor is viewed as the domain expert who advises Aquaculture 
Co. on research and development. In addition, he provides connections to external 














- Clearly stated mission statement with focus on innovation.
- Strong commitment by Chairman cum MD and top management of Aquaculture co. in 
leveraging on innovative products to differentiate itself for "survival" of business.
Where to Innovate?
- New Product creation: Clear focus on technological innovation in core business of 
breeding of fish and fry.
- New Business expansion: Driving innovation in business model through adjacent 
market of edible fish.
- Incremental innovation: Encourages every staff to innovate in daily operation and 
processes.
How much to innovate?
- No fixed budget. Chairman cum MD believes in "gut feel" and invest when opportunity 
arises. 
Values & Culture
Strong innovation culture with embedded processes and mechanism in place:
- Recognition and rewards for staff who drive innovation initiatives
- Achievement of industry awards and certifications aligned to innovation focus
- Engagement processes to reinforce innovation culture through informal coffee chat 
sessions with staff, regular town hall communication sessions.
Domain expertise
- Board member includes professor from university focusing on aquaculture research
- Tacit knowledge of long serving staff and family members.
Soft skills e.g. customer sensing, ideas and concept evaluation, team management, 
venture management
-Believe in experiential learning through on-the-job training e.g. sent a third-generation 
family member to China as GM.
- Expose staff to emerging technologies and global best practices through overseas study 
trip and seminars.
How to innovate more effectively?
- Innovation process is not structured. 
- Key investment decision by Chairman cum MD based on "Gut Feel".
- Incremental innovation through ground up staff driven initiatives.
With Whom to innovate?
Decision on partners to co-innovate lies with Chairman and top management. Trust 
in key personnel is one of main decision driver:
- Work closely with Institutes of higher learning on technology innovation.
- Business model innovation through collaboration with in-market partners such as China 
partners for edible fish.
Who should be responsible?
- Chairman cum MD is the key decision maker for large investment projects. C-level 
clearly responsible for innovation investment.
- Independent board members perform advisory roles.














Case Study 2 – Marine Co.  
 
• Background  
 
Marine Co. was listed on the SGX in 2005. The company’s roots trace back to 
1962 when its founder, together with two other business partners, began a business 
in electronics goods trading. In 1988, the business partners decided to part ways due 
to differences in business direction. Its founder then focused Marine Co.’s core 
business on supply chain management in the marine industry. Marine Co.’s second-
generation leaders elevated the business to new heights through both geographical 
expansion into Vietnam, China, India and the Middle East as well as by capturing 
new adjacent business opportunities through expanding product and services. 
 
The company now has four key strategic business pillars: supply chain 
management, design and manufacturing solutions, engineering solutions as well as 
surveillance and cyber security solutions. Marine Co. serves customers mainly from 
oil and gas, marine and offshore as well as industrial and petrochemical sectors. 
This is a sector that has faced multiple global challenges. Under the leadership of 
the second generation, Marine Co. has diversified its business into cyber security 
and information technologies which represent growth sectors unlike its core 









• Company Structure 
 
The company features a board helmed by the second-generation leaders. The 
executive Chairman cum CEO is the second son of the founder, who succeeded the 
chairman role from his elder brother that passed away in 2016. The CEO’s younger 
brother is the Chief Operating Officer of the organisation and serves on the board 
as a director as well. There are five family members including third-generation 
family on the management team of nine. The family owns 60% of the company’s 
shares. 
 
• Innovation Focus 
 
Marine Co.’s leadership team knew that in order to remain competitive in their 
industry, they had to innovate and value-add beyond products: 
“In the past, Marine Co. was very product-based. Over the years we have developed 
it to become solution-based.” Executive Chairman cum CEO, Marine Co. 
 
As they expanded their solution-focused capabilities, they ventured into 
adjacent industry sectors such as LED lights for marine use. Joint ventures and 
acquisition represent means deployed by Marine Co. in order to equip itself with 
the necessary skillsets and talents. The C-suites of Marine Co. have outlined a clear 
direction of innovation focus for the organisation, namely environmental, 
electrification and digitalisation. As the maritime industry evolves, Marine Co.’s 




management team wanted to innovate and set the industry benchmark in delivering 
solutions that are environmentally friendly and sustainable for their clients. They 
observe that onboard equipment is evolving from mechanical to electrical and hence 
decided to invest in solutions that provide vessels with electrical engines that reduce 
polluting emissions. Digitalisation represents the third pillar of innovation focus as 
they strive to equip customers with solutions for protection from cyber security risks 
and to improve current business processes using straight-through processing and 
automations in order to improve productivity and business efficiency. 
 
Marine Co.’s independent board of directors includes a veteran from the 
power and energy sector who provides advice to Marine Co. in the technical domain. 
The other two independent directors hold expertise from legal and finance domains. 
The innovation strategy is collectively devised by the C-level executives of Marine 
Co. The Chairman cum CEO of Marine Co. is viewed as the key decision-maker 
regarding innovation investment.  
  








- Clear commitment by Chairman cum CEO to invest into innovation to 
differentiate the company from competition and to drive business growth 
amidst challenging industry landscape in marine industry.
- Alignment of vision across business unit heads through formation of top 
management committee to drive innovation and growth.
Where to Innovate?
- In the core business of Marine industry, solutions that reduce carbon 
footprint in alignment to industry legislations.
- Diversification into other industry through acquisition of cybersecurity 
solution entity that was proven in marine sector and has potential across 
other industry sectors.
How much to innovate?
- No fixed budget. Investment is based on business case and decision by C-
level driven by motivation to grow.
Values & Culture
- Existing corporate culture is risk averse and conservative. This is 
influenced by long serving employees in marine sector.
- Management driving culture change through staff engagement and 
communications. An area that is still work-in-progress.
Domain expertise
- Tacit knowledge from long serving employees and family members in 
marine industry.
- New technology through acquisition of a cybersecurity and surveillance 
company.
- Leverage on institute of higher learning for research and development of 
emerging technologies.
Soft skills e.g. customer sensing, ideas and concept evaluation, team 
management, venture management
- Lack of innovation soft skill set due to incumbent base of employees in 
marine industry sector that is relatively slow in its pace of change.
- Third generation family leaders driving changes through bringing in new 
talent and introduction of digitalisation. 
How to innovate more effectively?
- Driven by top management through partnering with industry experts and 
through acquisitions. 
- Ground up innovation is lacking due to incumbent employees base with 
conservative mindset. 
With Whom to innovate?
- Work closely with institutes of higher learning on R&D for emerging 
technologies.
Who should be responsible?
- Chairman cum CEO is key decision maker for large investment projects. 
- Independent board members perform advisory roles and provide network 
connection in marine industry as needed by top management team.
- Top management committee formed to drive business innovation and 















Case Study 3: TCM Co. 
 
 
• Background  
 
TCM Co. was founded in 1879 in Gopeng, Perak, Malaysia by its founder 
operating a single medical shop. It was the second-generation leader, the founder’s 
only son who brought the business to the next level by establishing himself in 
Malaya and Singapore and becoming a leading figure in tin mining and rubber 
plantation businesses by the 1920s. The second-generation leader expanded the 
medical shop beyond Gopeng, Malaysia to Singapore. The traditional Chinese 
Medicine (TCM) business has grown from a small, homegrown business to a 
regional company with retail stores in Hong Kong, Macau, China, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Australia as well as two factories in Hong Kong and Malaysia. The 
company was listed on the SGX in 2000 but was delisted in 2016.  
 
• Company Structure 
 
The company features a board helmed by a fourth-generation leader who was 
the CEO of the company known to be instrumental in elevating the homegrown 
business to a global level through its listing on the SGX in 2000. He hired a 
professional CEO when he stepped down in 2017 but remained the chairman of the 
board. The family owns 23.8% of the company’s shares with the private equity 
firm’s injection of capital in 2016 when the company was delisted from the SGX 
and became private. 
 




• Innovation Focus 
 
TCM Co. is viewed as a game changer in its industry by transforming the 
way TCM is retailed. It was the first in the industry that redesigned the look and 
feel of traditional medical halls to look like a designer store: 
“We started with the design, actually. I think just changing the look and feel 
of the stores, retail design, packaging design. To me it was pretty 
straightforward. People might think that, why should the medical hall go and 
spend money employing good interior designers, and having expensive 
materials they install? I think we changed the industry that way. We influenced 
the industry that way. Now you see a few more chains have come up. At least 
they have some basic principles of retail design, and they look decent.” 
Chairman, TCM Co. 
 
 TCM Co. also transformed the packaging of TCM products to reach a 
broader segment of customers. Its innovative culture is also demonstrated in the 
creation of new revenue streams from its “gifting” business of retailing hampers 
with TCM products.  
 
 The chairman of TCM Co. shared that his expectation is for every business 
leader to innovate, whether in business operations or new product development: 
 “At the basic operating level, you have to think about what you innovate, 
how you innovate, in order to increase your business. It's just improvements to 
how we can develop the business on a day-to-day basis, right? It includes things 
like your whole CRM program, marketing, new ways of marketing, new ways of 




reaching the potential customers. At a corporate level you are looking at mostly 
longer-term things. It includes product development, partnership with 
universities and so on.” 
 
TCM Co. operates a research lab where they investigate new product 
development. Research heads and scientists are hired to drive product development. 
The investment in R&D for new product innovation is evident from the patents 
owned by TCM Co. 
 
The Chairman of TCM Co.’s board champions TCM Co.’s innovation culture 
and focus. As the fourth-generation family leader, he transformed TCM Co. by 
disrupting the business model of his industry. He establishes a clear focus for TCM 
Co.’s innovation strategy and demands his staff to drive innovation in their area of 
responsibility. The innovation strategy and execution are viewed as the 
responsibility of the executive team. TCM Co. has also established a “scientific 













- Chairman set the foundation of innovation through redefining TCM retail shop 
concept that is seen as a "Game changer" in the industry. 
- Clear vision and strategy in driving new revenue growth through product 
innovation. 
Where to Innovate?
- Commitment in product innovation with appointment of Chief Scientific Officer 
and patent filing.
- Regular strategic review of percentage of revenue from new product launched in 
last three years set clear focus of company in driving new product innovation.
How much to innovate?
- No fixed budget. Established a Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) that will provide 
recommendation to CEO and board on matters of science, medicine and emerging 
technologies that are relevant to the growth of the Group.  SAB also recommends 
product innovation and strategic initiatives based on emerging technologies and 
scientific advancement. 
Values & Culture
- Establishment of SAB demonstrated the value that TCM Co. placed on the 
development of new products and capabilities for the group, to ensure on-going 
relevance and innovation.
Domain expertise
- Strong domain expertise driven by scientific research. Establishment of SAB and 
innovation labs in TCM Co. entrenches its leadership position in the industry.
Soft skills e.g. customer sensing, ideas and concept evaluation, team 
management, venture management
- Leverage on company wide "Design Thinking" training to drive focus on consumer 
centric innovation. Use of concepts such as "Popup" store to test new ideas with 
agility shows the existence of soft skills in TCM Co. in driving innovation.
How to innovate more effectively?
- Chairman of the board, with his dual role as a family owner, sets the focus of 
innovation and expectation of innovation outcomes.
- Product innovation driven by SAB.
- Incremental innovation through ground up staff driven initiatives.
With Whom to innovate?
- SAB recommends collaboration strategy with external partners.
Who should be responsible?
- CEO and Scientific Officer responsible for driving strategic innovation initiatives.
- The board performs advisory role and provides strategic guidance to C-suite
- SAB is responsible for making recommendations at corporate level for product 
innovation.




















Integrated Oil Co. was founded in the 1950s. The second-generation leader 
further grew the business to become an integrated agri-business that is now one of 
the largest palm oil processors in the world by capacity. Integrated Oil Co. produces 
a wide range of refined and fractionated vegetable oils and fats principally from 
palm oil. The company has integrated operations throughout the edible oils and fats 
value chain, including sourcing and processing of raw materials as well as packing, 
branding, merchandising, shipping and distribution of the products. Integrated Oil 
Co.’s products are sold to customers in more than 100 countries, and the company 
became listed on the SGX in 2010. 
 
• Company Structure 
 
The second-generation successor, the eldest son of the founder of Integrated Oil 
Co., is the current executive Chairman of the organisation. He has four children, of 
which three are actively involved in the company operations. His eldest daughter is 
the CEO of the company and is assisted by her sister who holds the COO position. 
The youngest son is involved in the trading business of Integrated Oil Co. but is not 
part of the senior management team. Integrated Oil Co. is a publicly listed company 
on the SGX with 85% of its shares held by the family. The Chairman, CEO and 
COO of Integrated Oil Co. sit on the board alongside four independent board 
members and one executive board member who is the organisation’s head of risk 




management. The three family leaders also formed part of the company’s seven-
member senior management team. 
 
• Innovation Focus 
 
Integrated Oil Co. believes in investing in R&D as a catalyst for change in 
product innovation. The organisation has an “Innovation and Knowledge 
Management Centre” that incubates new commercial solutions based on customer 
insights and needs. Integrated Oil Co. does not limit its innovation efforts to product 
development, as the organisation has also driven business expansion though 
investment in a new palm-oil refinery, a palm-oil-based dairy manufacturing 
facility and a biodiesel plant in Malaysia. It has also added rice, dairy and palm-
based soap to its product portfolio. 
 
The focus of Integrated Oil Co. is clear regarding driving product innovation 
and business expansion: 
 
“First is product creation. Secondly, it's channel creation.” Chairman, Integrated 
Oil Co.  
 
 
 Integrated Oil Co. focused on product innovation through collaboration with 
key industry experts. Using their domain knowledge of the industry and its 
challenges, they focused on driving product innovation that enables them to achieve 
increased value: 
 




“I have to develop so-called alternative proteins. One is using insects. The other is 
from molasses and sugar. The first thing we did was we tried to look for lactic acid, 
produce lactic acid that is used as an antiseptic, kill germs and all that, so that all 
these animals don't need antibiotic, antibiotic substitute. So, we approached XXX 
University and work with the professors. Then we want to look into algae, which is 
the biggest source of omega 3, to rear salmon. So, we went to ... My board director 
recommended this Professor xxx. He's the head of oceanic science in University of 
Malaya. So, that's what I meant by climbing up the knowledge tree, going up and 
up.” Chairman, Integrated Oil Co.  
 
 Besides product innovation, Integrated Oil Co. has also leveraged their 
established channel distribution network and market intelligence to expand their 
business via adjacent industries such as dairy products. 
 
 The Chairman of Integrated Oil Co. is also the second-generation family 
leader who drove the global expansion of the business. He is viewed as the driver 
of innovation in the organisation. Innovation investment decisions are mainly 
handled by the Chairman and CEO of the organisation. The independent board 
members are not viewed to be involved in governing innovation. 
  








- Innovation very much driven by Chairman, supported by C-suite with focus on product 
innovation to drive growth and retain market leadership.
Where to Innovate?
- Product innovation in core business is a clear focus, e.g. establishment of "Innovation 
and Knowledge Management Centre".
- Business model innovation driven by tacit knowledge of channel partners in different 
market and opportunistic in nature.
How much to innovate?
- No fixed budget. Investment based on business case and decision by C-level driven by 
motivation to grow.
Values & Culture
- Integrated Oil Co. as a family business values long serving employees and does not 
endorse "hire-and-fire" mode of operation. Long serving employees are operation 
focused and resistant to change which hinders innovation drive.
- Innovation is top-down decision driven by family leaders.
Domain expertise
- Tacit knowledge from long serving employees, channel partners and family members in 
integrated Oil Co. ensures its strong domain expertise in its core business.
- Long term relationship established with channel partners in different markets provides 
the local market knowledge needed for Integrated Co. to evolve and grow its product 
portfolio and market share.
- Acquire emerging technology and knowledge through acquisition and partnership with 
research institutions.
Soft skills e.g. customer sensing, ideas and concept evaluation, team management, 
venture management
- Lack of innovation soft skill among core employee base due to incumbent base of 
employees in industry sector that is relatively slow in its pace of change. 
- Third generation family leaders take a top-down approach for innovation, driving 
innovation initiative centrally.
How to innovate more effectively?
- Driven by top management through partnering with industry experts and acquisition. 
- Ground up innovation is lacking due to incumbent employee base with conservative 
mindset. 
With Whom to innovate?
- Work closely with research institutions worldwide to gain access to expertise.
- Acquired entity with promising emerging technologies and innovation.
Who should be responsible?
- Chairman and CEO are key decision makers for large investment projects. 
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3.4.2 Findings from Phase 2 Case Study Research 
  
Using the qualitative data analysis program Nvivo (QSR International, Version 
12.1.0), we coded the qualitative data from phase 2 case study research and 
conducted iterative analysis by oscillating between the data. Figure 4 summarises 
the first-order codes, second-order categories and aggregate theoretical dimensions 
that emerged from phase 2 case study research data analysis.  
  
Four main findings emerged from the phase 2 case study research. Firstly, 
“family influence” factors, namely commitment to ensure the continuity of the 
family business, cohesiveness among family owners and clear controlling party of 
family firm, represent antecedents to establishing the corporate governance of 
innovation in Singapore Chinese family firms. Secondly, innovation leadership 
exhibited by key family leaders is a critical success factor to the governance of 
innovation in Chinese family firms. Family members who evangelise innovation 
initiatives drive clarity regarding the scope of innovation investment and the process 
of innovation management. Innovation leaders in family firms can make decisions 
faster than non-family firms due to the control they possess as owners. The role of 
the board of directors in Chinese family firms seems to be confined to providing 
connections to external collaborators in specific industry sectors. Thirdly, the 
corporate governance of innovation in Singapore Chinese family firms is broadly 
aligned at a high level without a codified process. Because innovation leadership 
involves top management and the board level, the clarity concerning the corporate 
governance of innovation in terms of “who to innovate, where and how much to 
innovate as well as with whom do we innovate” are dictated by family leaders who 




often assume the role of chairman of the board and/or the CEO of the organisation. 
However, there is a clear gap in the formal process of formulating innovation 
strategy as well as ambiguity in the structuring of innovation investment portfolios. 
Lastly, Singapore Chinese family firms face challenges in cultivating innovative 
human resources and culture, which is often tied to its belief in treating employees 
as extended family. A consequence is that terminating poor performers is not an 
accepted practice, which slows the pace of change required for driving innovation 
and represents an area of risk that family firms need to mitigate. 





Figure 4: Overview of Data Structure for Phase 2 Case Studies 
 




3.4.2.1 “Family Influence” Factors are Antecedents to Establishing the 
Corporate Governance of Innovation in Singapore Chinese Family Firms 
 
As we analyse the data from the interviews, “family influence” factors 
comprising “continuity”, “cohesiveness” and “control” emerged as antecedents to 
establishing the corporate governance of innovation in Chinese family firms.  
 
• Continuity of family business 
 
There is a strong commitment expressed by family members to ensuring the 
continuity of their family business across multiple generations. This motivates them 
to constantly innovate as it represents a means to ensure survivability and continuity 
of their family business.  
 
“Typically speaking, you look at a lot of family companies, especially SMEs, you'll 
probably find that ... Well, many changed now, but back in the day they may not 
want to invest into innovation, but now I think you'll find that most companies know 
that in order to survive they've got to continue innovation. Or else, I don't think 
you'll survive.” Chairman, TCM Co. 
 
“I feel that commodity products are going to die. We have to come up with a new 
product, go up market. So, my role is to create a department known as department 
of specialty fat. So then, with our marketers and our specialty fat division, with their 
members, the marketer, the two senior marketers, and researchers, they form a 




gang. And then what makes sense, what the market requires, you create.” Chairman, 
Integrated Oil Co. 
 
The family leaders in Chinese family firms consider it their responsibility to 
ensure that the business created by their forefathers will continue to flourish. To 
family leaders, their responsibility is not limited to the official duties of a business 
leader but also include the familial obligation to their ancestors to bring prosperity 
to their family. 
 
“We understand that we have another commitment, which is to uphold the family 
values, and we are the founder, and we want it to be continued ....” GM, 
Aquaculture Co. 
 
“After all, what is at stake will impact the entire family group. So, you knew you 




“I always tell my shareholders, you see, if I stop doing innovative projects or invest 
in R&D, I can show you the number. But our company will die after I leave the 
company. I'm highly irresponsible. So, this is why I always say, a CEO’s job is to 
think about beyond generation kind of business, which is your responsibility to two 
generations. Responsible guys always think about the survival of the company. Or 
the sustainability of the company. That his actions affect so many other people and 




if the company can survive, they will bring good things to other people.” Chairman 
& CEO, Aquaculture Co. 
 
The commitment to innovation in family firms is also driven by family 
members’ desire to ensure that the “expanded family”, which includes all staff 
working for the firm rather than solely direct family members, will benefit from the 
family firm. This desire drives their long-termism and commitment to innovation. 
 
 
“I always view the people below me as my family members, regardless if they are 
Yap, Tan, Lim or whatever. I always view them as a family, so the result itself is 
only a number to me. At the current stage, I’m always thinking about how can I 
think long term of the people in the long run? So, when I have this strong mindset, 
I always think about the future, what is the next ten years or fifty years down the 
road? How should I make sure whatever I put into the company, whatever that I 
built in the company, you continue to do so that the rest of the family members will 
benefit from what I have done for them?” Deputy MD, Aquaculture Co. 
 
 The desire of management teams in family firms to innovate in order to 
ensure continuity of their family business is aligned with stewardship leadership 
traits as explained by Miller, Le Breton-Miller and Scholnick (2008). Due to the 
unification of the roles of owners and managers in family firms, their decision-
making behaviour is driven more by socioemotional wealth aspects as explained by 
the behavioural agency model (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Family members 
operating the business have a strong mission to preserve what their forefathers 
created. 




Besides the desire to “pass down the family name”, higher purposes 
including “doing good for staff and family members”, “doing the right thing, 
protecting the environment” were cited as driving forces behind family firms’ 
commitment to innovate. 
 
“We believe in contributing to the society, to the world, to the people. If you want 
to do easy business, you just buy property. That's the easiest business. It's a very 
resilient business. But that is only for personal wealth creation. We are always 
looking to see how to contribute back to the society. Even like the LED lighting 
product, we named it SOP, "Save Our Planet". We have made something which 
industrial players say that we are insane for. For electrical products, to have 
recurring business. You need to do replacement. But we are developing something 
which can last for lifetimes.” Chairman and CEO, Marine Co. 
 
 Such motivation and commitment to innovate and “do good” are often 
inspired by the founder of the family business, which is shown in the words of the 
Chairman of TCM Co.:  
 
“I think most companies at some stage were probably a family business or at least 
maybe founded by somebody with a very strong vision. I think that trying to keep 
that essence is an important thing.”  
 
In an interview with an online magazine High Net Worth, the Chairman of 
TCM Co. elaborated on his vision that is driven by a higher purpose: 
 




“My vision was really driven by the purpose of the company, which is to help 
people. I think it's a very noble cause to try and help others. If you can grow a 
company by helping people and be able to make money at the same time, that's a 
win-win for everybody.”  
 
 The “why” of innovation is strongly supported by family members’ 
commitments to sustain their family business over multi-generations. Family 
leaders strongly express a clear mandate to “innovate or die”.  
 
• Cohesiveness among family members 
 
Cohesiveness among family members emerged as an antecedent to innovation 
governance in family firms. The alignment of vision among family members forms 
a strong driving force that ensures innovation governance across the organisation 
does not stop at the CEO level or become an “innovation theatre” in which 
innovations are pursued to impress rather than deliver results. 
 
“I think for us, it's more special. Because we bear the “X” (anonymised) surname, 
and then we got more responsibility. And we know innovation is very important for 
differentiating ourselves. I'm glad that all my cousins have the same mindset.” GM, 
Aquaculture Co. 
 
“I think in family businesses, blood is thicker than water. The cohesiveness will be 
stronger, and in difficult times, the chance of rebounding back is higher.” HR 
Director, Marine Co. 







 The alignment among family members concerning who drives the business 
is important: 
 
“Relationship structure. Let's say you got 10 family members, you decide one or 
two, and who are the guys to run it. Those that cannot, please get out.” Chairman, 
Integrated Oil Co. 
 
Cohesiveness also denotes “trust” among family members, which represents a 
critical factor for innovation to flourish (Covey, 2006; Venohr, 2015). Habberson 
and Williams (1999) posit that family firms are unique due to the interaction 
between the family unit, business entity and individual family members. The data 
from this research support the resource-based view in which social capital is cited 
to entail a positive effect on product innovation (De Massis et al., 2015). 
Cohesiveness among family members is viewed as a supporting factor of alignment 
of views and hence achieving commitment to innovate. 
 
“The unity and the trust. Because we always believe that we are doing the right 
things. In fact, frankly, we have opportunity to delist the company. Actually, a lot of 
companies, list cos, do that during bad times. But after discussion we decided not 
to. Because the investors they have been with us for years now. And if we exit now, 
everybody will suffer huge losses because our company has not been doing well for 
the past few years. But we believe in continuing to invest. To a certain extent the 




family also loans a huge sum to the list co. If we want, we can cash out, but we did 
not. Instead we pump the money into the company. We try to help the company to 
settle certain issues. We have some cash flow in place then we can continue to run 
the business. We believe we want to grow the company.” Chairman & CEO, Marine 
Co. 
 
 When the family members are aligned and there is trust among them, the 
business can move forward in unison. Cohesiveness is even more critical to 
innovation as the investment and initiative typically requires a longer time horizon. 
Hence, without family cohesiveness, such long-term investments and vision will 
not succeed. 
 
• Control – Clear decision-maker  
 
The control that family members enjoy as major shareholders provide the 
decision power to drive long-term investments in innovation and to avoid pressure 
from shareholders who may be seeking short-term returns. 
 
 
“But I'm lucky because nobody can fire me because my family owns the business, 
so I can think about long term.” Chairman & CEO, Aquaculture Co. 
 
“Because of the history of the company, I had a freehand.” Chairman, TCM Co. 
  
This is aligned with the resource-based view in which family firms are 
observed to have patient capital and hence can fund longer time horizon innovation 




projects (De Massis et al., 2015). Family members may also pursue goals beyond 
financial objectives through the personalistic exercise of authority (Chrisman et al., 
2012). The family control also facilitates quick decision making: 
 
“But, we're shareholders, right? We make all the big decisions. We can allocate a 
lot of capital. So, that's different from scale and impact.” CEO, Integrated Oil Co. 
 
 It is critical for family members to have clear control and the ability to make 
decisions. Without control there will be a lack of clarity regarding who drives 
innovation. Clear direction by key leaders at the board and executive level is key to 
the corporate governance of innovation.  
 
3.4.2.2 Innovation Leadership is Key to Effective Execution of the Corporate 
Governance of Innovation  
 
Exhibiting innovation leadership by family leaders in Chinese family firms 
represents a critical success factor to the effective corporate governance of 
innovation. Innovation leadership includes establishing the innovation vision. 
 
“I have a mission statement. Initially, the capability of Aquaculture Co., we are 
talking about supply chain, customer service quality. Then I must add in innovation 
and technology because no matter what kind of new things you do you have to 
involve technology anyway, nowadays. So, technology is something that I wanted 
to put in. And I want, before I retire, I want people to call Aquaculture Co. a 
technology company. Not a fish company because, regardless of what we do, we 




use technology to do what we are doing, you know?” Chairman & CEO, 
Aquaculture Co. 
 
The strong belief of family leaders, often the Chairman and/or CEO, drive 
the importance of innovation across the organisation. 
 
“Because of the new economy. Because it's globalised. There is competition from 
all over the world with the help of the new medias. So, everything is so transparent, 
and you must be very innovative to be ahead of your competitors.” Chairman & 
CEO, Marine Co. 
 
 Family leaders exhibiting innovation leadership have a clear vision of “why 
innovate” and “where to innovate”. The area of “how much to innovate” however 
is primarily driven by their “gut feel”. From the interview data, we observed that 
the family leader establishes the innovation investment directions although there is 
often no structured allocation of specific investment quantum. Most decisions are 
instead reached based on the leader’s “gut feel” or opportunities in which they 
strongly believe: 
 
“Sometimes you have to use the guts. You can always put numbers on the paper and 
do all the changes because those really stifle your decision-making process. You 
must look at a person, you have to look at a professor, can I trust you? Yes, I think 
I can. Because the way you talk. Okay, anyway, I know this professor X years 
already. So, I know his character. All these kinds of things will come together and 




then form your opinions, say yes, or we'll do this project.” Chairman & CEO, 
Aquaculture Co. 
 
“It's opportunistic. If it’s viable, we took a bet. That means the original plan 
versus the actual, very different. You just keep changing, until you find something 
that's operable. So, we do that all the time. We did dairy, we bought a biodiesel 
plant, and then we bought vessels and ships. And we didn't have any of this 
domain knowledge.” CEO, Integrated Oil Co. 
 
 The “gut feel” and “opportunistic” approach of family leaders seem to guide 
investment in innovation. The advantage of this approach is that decisions can be 
made quickly without the problem of “paralysis by analysis” experienced by large, 
non-family firms.  
 
“If a good idea comes across the board, and then, it exceeds the budget, Chairman 
would just bang the table and go ahead, and things like that.” GM, Aquaculture Co. 
 
“The CEO gave me the fullest support whenever I needed to collaborate with 
research entities/institutions or relevant R&D scientists (both local and overseas). 
In fairness, between the period 2007 till early 2011 - the CEO and I were really 
pushing the boundary of “traditional heritage with a modern touch of bioscience” 
within the Group.” Ex-Chief Scientific Officer, TCM Co. 
 
Similarly, the CEO of Integrated Oil Co. stated,  
 




“Because if you talk to 20 people, 20 people will tell you 20 different things to do. 
That’s the problem.” 
  
However, the risk is that “intuition” is based on past experiences which may 
also pose a risk: 
 
“My issue is that we're making a lot of decisions based on intuition, which may be 
wrong, and not actually data driven. That's my first thesis. My second thesis is that, 
because the company and things have changed so much, the intuition is even (more) 
wrong.” CEO, Integrated Oil Co. 
 
Researchers (Burke & Miller, 1999; Dane & Pratt, 2007; Dane, Rockmann 
& Pratt, 2012) have found that intuitive decisions are effective only in cases where 
one has acquired a moderate to high level of domain expertise. Innovation 
investment involves decisions concerning new emerging technology or new 
business areas. The decision-maker must be conscious of when “gut feel” or 
“intuition” may not be reliable due to situations beyond his or her domain expertise. 
 
Competent, independent board members with innovation skillsets can 
contribute added value to family leaders by providing outside-in views to 
complement their domain knowledge. 
 
“My board members change according to the needs of the company. You have to. 
Initially we only have lawyers and accountants, right? Or consultants. Okay my ex-
consultants become my board members. And then lawyers. IPO lawyer became my 




board member. As times change, a few years ago I started replacing some of the 
board members or add in new board members which pertain to innovations or 
technology. Two or three years ago I asked a retired AVA, head of fisheries, his 
PHD is in fish disease and other things, to become a board member. So, I develop 
board members according to the needs of the company.” Chairman & CEO, 
Aquaculture Co. 
 
“We have three very diversified independent board members. One is a lawyer, 
marine lawyer. One is running an audit firm. So very good by financial background. 
And one is engineer by ground. So basically, he's the one that sets up many power 
plants in Singapore. So, with their help, we also link up to several experts from their 
field.” Chairman & CEO, Marine Co. 
 
In family firms, we found family members involvement both at the board 
and management levels, which aids the alignment of innovation strategies and 
communications. One key pitfall of innovation management involves “confusion 
over a company’s innovation strategy” where the “innovation strategy is not made 
explicit, then top management has no choice but to guess what the board wants” 
(Deschamps & Nelson, 2014, p. 34). Hence, innovation leadership is critical to 
providing clarity in governing innovation strategy and execution.  
 
“I think the board has to endorse it, and the board has to give the direction that you 
want to go that way, and then set the KPIs, even for the CEO. The board will review 
the plans, and then they will set the tone. If they say, ‘Oh, where's the innovation 




strategy in the plan?’ Then if they don't have it, the board might say, ‘Well, we 
should put it in.’” Chairman, TCM Co. 
 
Family leaders must ensure that the appropriate board members are 
assembled and that the correct process and culture are embedded into the 
organisation in order to ensure tight execution of the innovation framework. Based 
on our research findings, family leaders in Chinese family firms view boards of 
directors as useful resources for connecting with potential collaborators for 
innovation projects. Board members who are domain experts can provide technical 
advice to the business, however there is a lack of innovation expertise at the board 
level. Innovation strategy is predominantly steered by the family leader who 
typically assumes the chairman position of the board.  
 
“The members of the TCM Co. board at that time comprised people who were 
experienced in corporate management, and perhaps the group’s bottom line was 
more crucial than exploring a new approach towards product development and 
investing in R&D for future expansion. Yes, at the board level - it is important to 
have diversity of members coming from varied backgrounds and relevant expertise. 
If there is a board member who understands innovation and technology, I think it’ll 
be good for him/her to help broaden the understanding of other board members and 
stakeholders.” Ex-Chief Scientific Officer, TCM Co. 
  
 Incorporating innovation experts into the boards of Chinese family firms 
can provide oversights in the corporate governance of innovation, complementing 




the “gut feel” approach of family leaders and mitigating risk by providing external 
perspectives which reduce blind spots in the decision-making process.  
  




The interview data show that Chinese family firms emphasise the alignment 
of culture and mindset of employees as core foundations to successful innovation. 
 
“In my experience, I don't think you necessarily need to call somebody the innovator 
and expert in the company, because I think it's everybody's role. You never know, 
someone can suggest things which will have an impact, and so it's actually, I think 
it's the culture of the company. I think it should be built in and it's the hardest thing 
to do.” Chairman, TCM Co. 
 
“No matter what the company is doing, to innovate or reorganise, I think the first 
thing to appease is the employee's heart. I feel that appeasement is the most 
important thing. When you want to change the policy and change direction, I feel 









  Based on the interviews with various family members in the case studies, 
family values heavily influence company culture. To a certain extent, the company 
culture is developed based on belief in the family system.  
 
 “In fact, in our family, a very basic philosophy that my father passed to us from the 
first generation, is about integrity and trust. No matter what we do, we must be 
honest and genuine… Father passed us a concept, that is, you must be sure that 
employees trust you and believe in you. If employees know how the boss is and are 








“The question is why we are less conservative, it's because of luck. Because of the 
cultures of my family. It's because of openness, because we don't care about money 
that much. We care about relationships more than anything else. So it's ... Why do 
we have this kind of culture? It's because we are very lucky to have this kind of 
parents, 上梁不正，下梁歪. Without those upbringings, we can't even, you know, 
behave as such. Do I choose to come to this family? No. It's by luck that I happen 
to be in this company. It's luck, okay? It's luck.” Chairman & CEO, Aquaculture 
Co. 
 




The “familiness” of the family firm includes its family values that form the 
foundation of the organisation’s culture. Family members are often inspired by the 
spirit of the founders, and stories about the founding fathers are passed down and 
serve as a strong demonstration of the company’s values. The family values that 
influence the company culture may not explicitly articulate the importance of 
innovation. However, values such as trust and delivering value to customers are 
important antecedents to driving an innovative culture. 
 
There is a blurring of lines between family and business that is also 
manifested in the interactive activities of the management team: 
 
“Like everything can be discussed... so that's why we emphasise a lot on family 
gatherings, or lunches together. So, I think, for us, a lot of times when we make key 
decisions, we just stick together. Just to have a meal, and that's where major 
decisions are made. So maybe more of being open to discussions, and things like 
that. I think that's one of the key factors.” Dir, Marketing & Business Development, 
Marine Co. 
 
 Family values and relationships strongly influence the organisational culture 
and become manifest in the intertwinement of decision-making processes that occur 
within family gatherings outside of formal business settings. Family leaders are also 
mindful of how they incorporate these values into the company and inspire their 
employees to become aligned with the company culture: 
 




“I've extended the definition of family. That regardless of race, sexual preferences, 
gender, you know, religious and all that; if you concur with my values, and you 
agree with my cultures, right, you're part of Aquaculture Co. members. So, we 
expanded the definitions of Aquaculture Co. Family.” Chairman & CEO, 
Aquaculture Co. 
 
“The culture of TCM Co. was still quite a family-oriented one - as during my time, 
a couple of cousins and relatives were on its payroll. But the CEO himself though 
was still honouring some gesture of “traditional values” and consideration - but he 
was very open-minded and constantly looking at new ways to improve the group’s 
business practices and to explore overseas market expansion. Thus, I would think 
that TCM Co.’s history was certainly a legacy, but it was the CEO’s vision and 
modern outlook leadership style that had given the 140-year-old company a ‘major 
facelift that resonated with the younger generation of customers!’” ex-Chief 
Scientific Officer, TCM Co. 
 
 Family members are also conscious of the importance of having the 
appropriate pool of human resources to ensure the success of their innovation efforts. 
A challenge faced by family leaders regards their long-serving employees’ inertia 
to change:  
 
“The most difficult for us is to make people change, and you need to convince people, 
why you need to do so. So, you need to spend a lot of time talking to them and trying 
to change their mindset and influence them.” Deputy MD, Aquaculture Co.  
 




“You have people who are working here for 20 over years. They are resistant to 
change, neither can they see change, and they are very resistant to external 
parties.” CEO, Integrated Oil Co. 
 
In Chinese family firms, management values employees who have worked 
for the organisation almost their entire career. “Hire and fire” is not a norm in 
Chinese business firms’ culture. While leaders know they might not be able to 
achieve the best output from some older workers who may resist changes, they 
choose to keep them due to social-emotional factors: 
 
“If someone works with you for 20 years, they may no longer be promoted, but they 
believe in seniority, so what do you do? There was one time, they fight in the 
trenches, they gave their utmost best, so what do you do?” CEO, Integrated Oil Co. 
 
However, the socio-emotional aspects of family firms sometimes pose a 
burden on the younger generation of leaders since non-performing staff may be 
retained based on emotional reasons: 
 
“Being in a family business, I think traditional Chinese businesses we hire, but we 
don't fire that easily. So even if someone is not doing well, they'll just give chances 
and chances, again and again. I think that's different from the MNCs. So even if we 
see that they are really not performing well, right, and then we bring it up, but 
they'll say, ‘Oh no. This worker, you cannot touch him or her because she has been 
working here for 20 years, 30 years.’ So many times, this brings to frustration 




because, for myself, I would like to have a more dynamic, or younger team.” Dir, 
Marketing & Business Development, Marine Co. 
 
By building human resources that embrace innovation culture, Chinese 
family businesses may have the advantage of “social-emotional factors” that 
motivate people to innovate in order to ensure sustainability of the business. The 
same factors may become a hindrance if the workers do not recognise the urgency 
to innovate or if they lack the competency to make innovation a success. This 
represents an area that the organisation must constantly monitor, and they must 
audit the gaps between what the organisation aspires to achieve versus the capability 
and willingness of the existing workforce to deliver the desired outcomes. 
 
3.4.2.4 Corporate Governance of Innovation is Aligned at a Broad Level but 
not Codified 
 
The unique family business structure, where the business, family and 
individual intersect, leads to an observed uniqueness in the corporate governance of 
innovation in Chinese family firms. There is a broad alignment of corporate 
governance of innovation in Chinese family firms in situations where the 
antecedents of “family influence” factors (continuity, cohesiveness, control) are 
present and innovation leadership is observed at the board and top management 
levels. The corporate governance of innovation, which we defined as “a system of 
mechanisms that aligns goals, allocates resources and assigns decision-making 
authority for innovation across the company and with external parties" 




(Deschamps & Nelson, 2014), is driven in Chinese family firms by the family leader 
who determines the dimensions regarding: 
- Why innovate? 
- Where to innovate? 
- With whom to innovate? 
- Who innovates? (The Chairman and/or CEO of the family firm is usually 
the driver.) 
 
The questions “how much to innovate” and “how to innovate” are not clearly 
answered. The allocation of resources to innovation is ambiguous and the decision 
is made based on family leaders’ intuition. There is no strict guideline such as 
providing a dedicated innovation fund to drive innovation projects. The process 
seems to be more fluid and decision power is held by family leaders who will make 
the investment decision.  
 
“You see, the problem of budgeting about R&D is something stupid. Because you 
never know when a good idea comes out, at that point you must adjust it. That 
number fluctuates. It's based on what kind of good ideas come up this year. You 
don't wait. You say, oh, I don't have budget and let's wait. No, no, no. This year I 
have three projects on hand. I know it's going to eat into a lot of my so-called 
expenses and all that. But I say, do it now. I mean, like, why do I have to schedule 
it?” Chairman & CEO, Aquaculture Co. 
 
“We have this not-official community where we gather all the subsidiary heads into 
so-called “One-XXX” (anonymised). We have these business unit heads sit together, 




and we try to explore ideas. We then set the directions. Three directions for the 
company: environmental, electrifications and digitalisation. So, these are the three 
areas that we have identified, going forward whatever we want to do, it must be 
very innovative. Someone has not done this before. You want to do something very 
niche, quite different from other companies.” Chairman & CEO, Marine Co. 
 
The innovation process differs depending on the values of the family leader. 
Some may be more fluid: 
 
“We have this unstructured. I don't want to structure innovation because it's so 
unreal. So, I think we are quite broad base in terms of involving all the people 
because you cannot structure it but ... I always believe if you want to make people 
a little bit more creative, you must create an environment for them to try things, and 
you must not penalise when they make mistakes. I only cannot accept the mistake 
they're making twice. I call that stupid mistakes. That they have not learned from 
the first mistake. That I totally cannot accept. But I encourage them to try.” 
Chairman & CEO, Aquaculture Co. 
 
While others may be more structured: 
 
“There’s actually a process, we do have a process. It's a decision tree, so you go 
for it, or you kill it in several stages. Different people at different stages make the 
decision. It will go up to the CEO as the final position, but along the way someone's 
got to think it's worth going forward with it.” Chairman, TCM Co. 
 




The innovation process differs depending on the beliefs of the family leader. 
Innovation management heavily relies on the top management team for disruptive 
innovation that requires high capital or resource investment. For incremental 
innovation, the belief is that all employees should be involved.  
 
 There are less structured, hierarchical, formal processes for innovation 
projects to commence:  
 
“But maybe if you are in a non-family business, that's a lot of red tape and things 
like that. Or things like you need to show certain figures, or certain supporting 
evidence first before you can embark on the project. While being a family business, 
you can do first and support evidence later. Because evidence normally only comes 
after you've carried out certain projects. Yeah. That's the pros of being a family 
business. We just have to present our points, our rationale, and our direction and 
what we expect to achieve.” Dir, Marketing & Business Development, Marine Co. 
 
There were no clear answers to questions about means of measuring 
innovation investment outcomes, but the Chinese family business leaders 
interviewed demonstrated a broad perspective regarding their perception of whether 
their innovation strategy is on track:  
 
“It becomes expressed as a kind of quantitative, factual … like, how many new 
products have you launched this year. Out of our top 20 products, in any given year, 
a certain percentage had to have been launched in the last three years, or five years, 
whatever. Something like that.” Chairman, TCM Co. 





“I set up the R&D department about 10 years ago. It's because of R&D, we came 
up with the XXX (New product name). That was the very first time we came up with 
our own way of doing filtration. Conventionally they use filter material but now we 
use current electrolytes to break down the things that we don't want. Like ammonia 
and that. We retain all the minerals. We say, yeah, we have some results. How about 
we continue to do this?” Chairman & CEO, Aquaculture Co. 
 
There is no formal process or documentation at the board or top management 
levels that outline the innovation strategy and execution plans. Many aspects of 
innovation strategy and execution are driven by the family leaders who are 
committed to sustain the family business’s growth, and the decisions are made 
based on their intuition. There is a lack of governance in ensuring an optimal 
innovation investment portfolio with desired levels of resources allocated for both 
incremental (exploitive) and disruptive (explorative) innovation. The broad 
alignment of innovation strategy and vision in Chinese family firms is driven by 
innovative leaders without a structured method to ensure a balanced investment 
portfolio that is aligned with the strategy. 
  




3.4.3 CGOI Model and Propositions 
  
 From the case study research data in phase 2, a theoretical framework 
emerged as shown below in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Corporate Governance of Innovation in Singapore Chinese Family Firms 
 
 
Three key antecedents to establishing the corporate governance of 
innovation in Chinese family businesses emerged from our phase 2 data analysis. 




The antecedents to a strong corporate governance of innovation in Singapore 
Chinese family businesses are: 
• Cohesiveness among family members involved in the business management 
• Commitment to ensure multi-generation continuity of their family business  
• A decision-maker that has controlling power over the business 





The family influence factor of a strong desire to ensure continuity of the 
family business in order to “pass on the name and wealth” across multi-generations 
instils a strong commitment in family leaders to innovate. The family influence 
factor of “continuity” that drives the governance of innovation is aligned with the 
proposition proposed by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007), which is that in family firms, 
socioemotional wealth (SEW) represents a key variable that affects decisions. Our 
research reaffirms the importance of SEW in Chinese family businesses as a key 
factor behind innovation investment decisions. We posit that the desire to “pass 
down the name of the family across multi-generations” is stronger in Chinese 
families due to the influence of Confucius values. As Kao (1993) found through his 
research on Chinese entrepreneurs, “Confucian tradition is remarkably persistent” 
and “enterprise is still a means of exerting control -and for achieving security in a 
disordered world” (p. 25). Filial piety is a key Confucius value, and for Chinese 
family firms continuity of their business and carrying the name of their founding 
father is considered a family duty. Our research affirms the importance of 
“continuity” in Chinese family firms and discovered that it is a key motivator for 
Chinese family businesses to focus on innovation. 
 
Cohesiveness among family members involved in the management of the 
organisation enables a strong, consistent answer to the question of “why innovate”. 
As scholars have discovered, Chinese family businesses have a distinct difference 
from other ethnic groups’ family businesses regarding their focus on family ties 
even at the expense of other social relationships (Tan et al., 2001; Kao, 1993). This 
is often described as “familism” and is rooted in Confucianism which profoundly 
influences Chinese ethnic groups for more than 2000 years. In our research, the 




“cohesiveness” of family members holding management positions in the 
organisation represents a critical factor to driving the corporate governance of 
innovation. This can be viewed as part of “familiness”, referring to resources unique 
to family businesses. Hoffman, Hoelscher and Sorenson (2006) described resources 
embedded in the relationships among people as social capital comprising three 
dimensions: structural, cognitive and relational. They defined structural 
components as the social capital derived from network ties and configurations. The 
cognitive dimension is based on a shared language and narratives, while the 
relational dimension is based on trust, norms and obligations (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
We use the term “cohesiveness” to refer to the binding force among family leaders 
as a critical factor that will drive a consistent message regarding their corporate 
innovation direction and strategy.  
 
The control of family leaders with majority shares of the business provide 
the leader with power to drive long-term investments as well as the ability to make 
decisions deemed beneficial to the business in the long term. The family influence 
factors of cohesiveness, continuity and control provide the foundation for family 




The clarity of corporate governance of innovation increases with the level of 
innovation leadership exhibited by family leaders of Chinese family firms.  
 




 Our research shows that the innovation agenda in Chinese family businesses 
is driven by its leader who holds a clear vision and commitment to innovation 
investment. The leader and his or her C-suites provide clarity regarding “why 
innovate”, “what to invest”, “where to innovate” and “with whom to innovate”, and 
the decisions are made by key family members in both formal as well as social 
settings. The uniqueness of family businesses lies in the intersection of the business, 
family and individual. There is a strong corporate governance of innovation when 




An increased emphasis on the corporate governance of innovation in the board 
agenda increases the effectiveness of innovation investment portfolio 
management. 
 
Our research sheds light on the current gap in CGOI in Singapore Chinese 
family firms in the area of innovation investment portfolio management. Decisions 
concerning innovation investment in terms of quantum and time horizon lie with 
the controlling family leaders. There is no clear strategy for ensuring a balanced 
innovation portfolio in both incremental innovation and disruptive innovation 
projects. Singapore Chinese family business leaders adopt an opportunistic 
approach and make decisions based on “gut feel”. Independent board members are 
not proactively involved in the corporate governance of innovation. The role of 
independent board members is limited to connecting with external collaborators for 




innovation initiatives. Based on our phase 1 research shown in Figure 2, the board 
of directors play a key role in the CGOI in terms of: 
 
• Review and approve innovation strategy: Why, What, Where, When, Who, 
How 
• Control of resources 
• Monitoring of outcome and performance 
 
Our model of the CGOI at the board level (Figure 2) highlights the need for 
innovation expertise in the board in order to drive effective corporate governance 
of innovation. By having a structured approach and developing an optimal portfolio 
of innovation investments, Singapore Chinese family business can avoid becoming 
blindsided by the current “intuitive” approach in innovation strategy when the pace 




The stronger the family culture of tolerating long-term employees who are 
non-performers, the weaker the innovation culture and greater resistance to 
change.  
 
 Innovation culture is a critical success factor that enables an organisation to 
be effective in its innovation management. By conducting this research, we also 
uncovered the linkage between family values and company culture: The deep-
rooted family values passed down from founders become the company’s core 




beliefs that drive the culture. Family business leaders regard long-serving 
employees as their expanded family and firing long-serving staff when their 
performance lags is not an accepted practice in Chinese family firms. This creates 
a hindrance to building innovation culture in the organisation, and thus Chinese 
family firms must investigate ways to manage this soft aspect of innovation 
governance. Without a clear strategy for ensuring the establishment of innovation 
culture and upskilling the current workforce to be competent in innovation 
management, the innovation strategy’s pace of execution will become hindered. 
This represents an area of risk that must be considered under the corporate 
governance of innovation. 
 
  




CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
 
 The aim of this dissertation was to examine the model of the corporate 
governance of innovation (CGOI) in Singapore Chinese family businesses. The 
research focused on the role of the board, family influence factors and constructs 
that form the CGOI model for Singapore Chinese family firms. In this chapter, the 
strengths and weaknesses of the current CGOI observed in Singapore Chinese 
family firms are discussed and recommendations are provided. A checklist for the 
CGOI is also presented to facilitate practitioners’ self-assessment of their 
organisation’s strengths and weaknesses in the area of CGOI. 
 
 
4.1 The “Yin and Yang” of Corporate Governance of Innovation in 
Singapore Chinese Family Firms  
 
 Yin yang is a unique Chinese duality and way of thinking that captures the 
“Chinese view of paradox as interdependent opposites compared with the Western 
view of paradox as exclusive opposites” (Law & Kesti, 2014, p. 1). The need to 
have proper corporate governance of innovation and the Chinese family way of 
driving innovation based on “uncodified” processes, “gut feel” and “family” 
discussions are similar to the “yin” and “yang” of ancient Chinese philosophy. A 
balance between the structured, formal governance processes and the unstructured 
engagement model of Chinese family firms can be achieved through a clear 
governance model of innovation in which alignment is accomplished from the board 
level to the working level. 
 




4.1.1 SWOT Analysis of Current CGOI of Singapore Chinese Family 
Business 
 
As we researched the CGOI of Singapore Chinese family businesses and 
define CGOI as "a system of mechanisms that aligns goals, allocates resources 
and assigns decision-making authority for innovation across the company and 
with external parties" (Deschamps, 2013), the strengths, weaknesses, threats and 
opportunities for Singapore Chinese family businesses unfold as shown in Figure 6 
below: 
 





 In Chinese family businesses, we found that the answers to “why innovate” 
and “who innovates” are typically clearly articulated and understood across the 
organisation. Family members have a strong survival instinct, and the leaders of the 
organisation mandate innovation efforts in order to ensure continuity of the family 




business. The need to ensure the passing down of family names across multiple 
generations (continuity) is tied to the Chinese value originating from Confucius 
values which consider it a part of filial piety to ensure the flourishing of the business 
created by one’s forefather, which drives family leaders’ commitment to innovation. 
We observed strong innovation visions from the four Singapore Chinese family 
firms in our case study research. 
 
 We observe that the key innovation driver is the Chairman and/or CEO of 
the organisation who are key family business leaders. There is less red tape in 
approving innovation investments due to family members’ converged roles of both 
owner as well as manager. This provides the necessary speed for innovation 
decisions and patient capital with family business’s long-termism. For innovation 
in the family business’s core business, tacit knowledge of workers and family 




 Chinese family businesses’ culture of treating their long-serving employees 
as their expanded family and resulting high tolerance for non-performing staff 
represent a weakness in driving innovation culture which may hinder the effective 
execution of innovation strategies. While long-serving employees possess tacit 
knowledge in the core industry, they may not have the skillset to drive innovation 
or awareness of new emerging technology or business models that might disrupt 
their current business.  
 






 The independent board of directors in Chinese family businesses is limited 
to providing access to external collaborators and advice in their domain area. Based 
on our research in phase 1 on the board’s role in the governance of innovation, we 
posit that innovation expertise at the board level can increase the effectiveness of 
the corporate governance of innovation at the board level. The advantage of family 
firms is that the shareholders are also the key executives at the board level. Hence, 
shareholders’ expectations regarding how the board can increase effectiveness in 
governing innovation can be achieved relatively easily. Incorporating a diverse mix 
of independent board members with innovation expertise in Chinese family 
businesses provides the opportunity to enhance the knowledge of family leaders and 
to introduce an “outside-in” perspective of potential disruptions and trends that the 




 A key threat in Chinese family business regards the absence of antecedents 
for establishing the CGOI. Based on the research, the three antecedents that 
emerged in the CGOI model are: commitment to drive continuity of the family 
business, cohesiveness among family members involved in business management 
and a clear controlling stakeholder that can make decisions. In many family 
businesses, the harmony and alignment among family members seem to be key 
internal disruptors to business growth. If there are no clear controlling stakeholders, 
decisions become stalled and business strategy, including innovation strategy, 




becomes hindered. This represents a key threat that Chinese family firms must be 
aware of when driving the CGOI. 
 
 The CGOI in Chinese family businesses does not provide clear guidance 
regarding innovation portfolio and investment in the area of “exploitation” versus 
“exploration”. An innovation leader who invests too much in “exploration” may 
risk depleting the resources of the organisation, but on the other hand, insufficient 
investment in innovation projects may entail long-term risks of disruption or 
displacement. The current CGOI model of Chinese family businesses is based on 
the “gut feel” of the Chairman and/or CEO, which also represents a threat that 
Chinese family businesses must mitigate. We recommend that businesses provide 
clarity, including a dashboard view of all investments in different areas of 
innovation to be reviewed at the board level periodically. The organisation should 
also drive an audit of their innovation status using the checklist recommended in 
the following section. 
 
4.1.2 Recommendations: CGOI Checklist  
 
 Considering today’s ambiguity regarding the CGOI, from its definition to 
the details of scope and execution, it is challenging for organisations to manage the 
risk of future displacement. Hence, we propose a checklist to facilitate the board of 
directors and C-level of family firms’ efforts in reviewing their organisation’s 
CGOI state. The checklist incorporates the key constructs of the CGOI model of 
Chinese family businesses, the roles of the board that emerged from our research as 




well as elements from Deschamps and Nelson’s (2014) innovation governance 
model. 
 
 The checklist provides a survey of the four key building blocks of CGOI as 
depicted in Figure 5, namely innovation leadership, innovation strategy, innovation 
capabilities and innovation outcome. In each building block we present the key 
elements of the CGOI in Singapore Chinese family businesses as well as indicators 
for auditing when the organisation has gaps in any of these elements. Table 3 shows 
the checklist that practitioners can use to perform periodic self-assessment of the 
organisation’s CGOI state. Figure 7 presents a dashboard view of the four key 
building blocks and the eleven elements in a spider web chart in order to provide a 
visual representation of the organisation’s current CGOI state.  
 
 
Figure 7: Dashboard View of CGOI Checklist Results of Organisation  





 Key indicators are used to ascertain the current state of the organisation in 
each of the eleven elements. A 5-point Likert scale is used in the checklist to enable 
users to assess the strength of each of the CGOI indicators. 
 
• Innovation Leadership 
 
Innovation leadership represents a key building block of the CGOI that emerged 
from our case study research of four Singapore Chinese family businesses. Using 
the CGOI model, we captured two key elements that drive innovation leadership: 
 
- Why innovate? 
 
The understanding and commitment to the purpose of innovation is a key 
element under innovation leadership. Based on the CGOI constructs in Singapore 
Chinese family businesses that emerged from our research, there are three indicators 
found to drive clarity behind this element of “why innovate”.  
 
Firstly, the organisation must have a well-defined innovation vision that is 
communicated by top management extensively throughout the organisation. 
Secondly, there must be alignment between the board of directors and top 
management team regarding the innovation vision, which must be thoroughly 
considered and discussed at the board level to ensure that the vision is not merely 
marketing fluff from the CEO. The innovation vision drives the behaviour and 
decisions of the board and top management in terms of innovation investment. For 
the innovation vision to cascade down throughout the organisation, the top 




management team needs to be committed to the vision. This cannot be solely the 
CEO’s job but must also be supported by the CEO’s management team in order to 
achieve traction and success. 
 
In our research, we uncovered family factors that influence the effectiveness of 
the CGOI in Singapore Chinese family businesses. Cohesiveness among family 
members involved in business operations and commitment to drive continuity of 
the family business represent two key family influence factors that impact the 
strength of innovation leadership. 
  
- Who is responsible for innovation? 
 
 
It is critical to ensure the clarity of roles and responsibilities of the board, top 
management and the working team that drives innovation. Based on our research in 
phase 1 on the roles and responsibilities of the board in the CGOI, the model shown 
in Figure 2 depicts the key roles, responsibilities and antecedents to the board’s 
effectiveness in executing their duties in governing innovation. In the checklist, we 
incorporated our findings under the indicator of “board’s roles & responsibilities”. 
The checklist enables organisations to assess whether the board is clearly aware of 
its role in innovation governance. An audit of the board’s meeting agenda to assess 
whether a regular review of innovation strategy occurs provides an indication of the 
board’s execution of governing innovation. Our research highlighted the criticality 
of incorporating board members with innovation experience and expertise in order 
to ensure the effective governance of innovation. This has thus been incorporated 
into our checklist as a lead indicator. The board’s role also includes recruiting a C-




suite that is capable of driving business growth. Hence, the nomination committee 
should also consider and incorporate the innovation criteria when recruiting C-suite 
executives. 
 
The second key indicator under the element of “who is responsible for 
innovation” concerns the C-suite innovation structure, which is an important 
construct in the CGOI for achieving clarity regarding innovation drivers. Aside 
from organisational structure clarity, it is critical to include clear performance 
indictors when measuring the innovation drivers’ performance.  
 
Our research has also revealed the need for a clear controlling party in family 
businesses who can make decisions including developing the innovation charter. 
This is also an indicator in the checklist which sheds light on the state of the CGOI 
in the family business regarding innovation drivers. 
 
• Innovation Strategy 
 
In our research, we found that Singapore Chinese family leaders tend to rely on 
their intuition to make judgement calls concerning innovation investment. The 
quantum of innovation investment as well as the time horizon that the organisation 
can tolerate for the return on investment in innovation are not clearly defined. 
Incorporating these items into the checklist enables the board and top management 
to discuss and determine the framework they wish to enforce in the organisation in 
order to guide innovation efforts. The checklist can also highlight areas where 
increased clarity may help achieve alignment between the board and top 




management teams regarding strategic focus. The checklist enables the family 
leaders to provide clarity concerning potential areas of weakness in their innovation 
strategy as well as take measures to mitigate such risks. However, this does not 
restrict the agility and flexibility of the leader in making decisions when 
opportunities arise. Providing clarity guides the executive team to meaningfully 
discuss exceptional cases that deviate from the formulated innovation strategy.  
 
The key elements in innovation strategy comprise the following elements: 
 
 
- What and where to innovate? 
 
 
For this element, we seek indicators in the clarity of scope and depth of 
innovation focus. The scope includes outlining the areas of innovation focus, 
whether in product innovation, process innovation, business model innovation, 
supply chain innovation etc. The scope also defines what is considered unreachable 
for the organisation, which includes “what will we not do” in terms of business 
expansion, new product development etc. Clarity in scope guides the investment of 
resources that support the organisation’s strategic growth focus. The depth of 
innovation regards areas to drive incremental innovation and further exploit current 
competitive advantages as well as areas for investment to seek disruptive innovation 
in order to explore new possibilities. 
 
- With whom to innovate? 
 
In our case study research, we observe that Chinese family businesses drive 
innovation through internal incremental innovation efforts and disruptive 




innovation through joint research with partners such as institutes of higher learning. 
Trust elements emerged from the research data that determine with whom they 
partner. In the CGOI, we have incorporated indicators for defining the areas of 
innovation that the organisation will drive internally as well as areas where they 
will seek external partnership. This guideline represents a useful practice for 
providing employees driving innovation clarity and alignment with management. 
The indicator for “type of partnership” encourages organisations to also consider 
the extent of partnership with which they are comfortable.  
 
 
- How much to innovate? 
 
In this element of CGOI, we posit that the organisation should provide a 
guideline for their innovation investment appetite in terms of quantum. The 
organisation should also maintain a dashboard view of their innovation investment 
portfolio (Mcgrath & Macmillan, 2000; Mcgrath, 2010). Frequent review of the 
dashboard allows management and the board to become aligned regarding 
investment balance of incremental versus disruptive innovation.  
 
 
- How long is the innovation horizon? 
 
 
This element is inter-related to the innovation portfolio discussed in the element 
of “how much to invest?”. The time horizon must be defined as well, as there needs 
to be a view of innovation investment in the short-, mid- and long-term horizon. 
The various investment horizons will ensure the organisation’s capability of 




maintaining current competitiveness while investing in areas that bring new 
capabilities to the business.  
 
Family businesses are found to have “patient capital” (Dobrzynski, 1993; Dreux, 
1990; De Massis et al., 2015) since they are committed to investing for the long 
term. This long-termism represents a strength of family businesses. We have 
developed an indicator for the clarity regarding organisational expectations of 
innovation investment.  
  
 
• Innovation capabilities 
 
 
The third building block of the CGOI, innovation capabilities, comprises three 






 The board and management must ensure that the organisation has an 
innovation process from ideation and experimentation to implementation. There 
must be a process in place to determine whether the organisation will increase the 
investment amount or resources for specific innovations in order to accelerate their 
success or to abort initiatives. This process of managing the lifecycle of innovation 
projects is critical. It is the role of the board and top management to ensure that the 
process is enacted and its effectiveness continuously improved. 
 
 






In our case study research, Chinese family businesses observe that their family 
value influences the corporate culture. The deep-rooted family values passed down 
from founders become the company’s core beliefs and drive the culture. Innovation 
culture represents a key element of “innovation capabilities”. Hence, we have 
included indicators for understanding the state of the CGOI in innovation culture in 





Without the appropriate human resources in place, innovation will not flourish. 
In this area, we examine indicators including the presence of domain expertise, soft 
skills in driving innovation initiatives as well as the organisation’s practice of 
continuously upskilling and retooling the organisation’s human resources. Our 
research data show that family business leaders view long-serving employees as 
their expanded family and that firing long-serving staff when their performance lags 
is not an accepted practice in Chinese family firms. This represents a hindrance to 
building innovation culture in the organisation. Including such indicators in the 
CGOI checklist ensures that underlying threats will rise to the board and top 









• Innovation Outcome 
 
 
This is a lagging indicator for companies regarding how well they are 
performing innovation governance. There are two key elements that we will 
measure in this pillar, performance measurement and measure of success.  
 
- Performance Measurement 
 
 
It is the duty of the board to ensure that they monitor the outcome of innovation 
initiatives as well as how well the top management team is executing innovation 
strategies. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of C-suite executives should include 
a measure of their effectiveness in driving innovation culture, executing the 
approved innovation strategy, and their management of resources for short-time, 
mid-term and long-term innovation investment. 
 
The board’s performance of the CGOI must be measured as well, which is a 
factor that emerged from our research in the phase 1 expert interviews. Shareholders’ 
expectations of the board in governing innovation as well as clear measurement of 
the board’s performance are antecedents to proactiveness of the board in governing 
innovation. Metrics that can be used to measure the effectiveness of board in CGOI 
can include the board’s frequency of review of innovation strategy and outcome. 
 
- Measure of success 
 
In CGOI, it is important to establish a measure of success such as percentage of 
revenue generated from new products created in the past three years, number of 




patents filed, number of new business launched etc. The measure of success will 
indicate whether the innovation strategy and execution are on track.
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(1 = Not at all; 2 = To a small 
extent; 3 = To a moderate extent; 
4 = To a great extent; 5 = To a 
very great extent.)
We have an innovation vision that clearly articulates the purpose and direction of innovation.
Our leaders communicate the innovation vision clearly and frequently to the organization.
The innovation vision is endorsed by our board of directors.
The top management team is committed to the innovation vision.
There is cohesiveness among family members involved in the management and operation of the company.
There is a strong motivation shown by family members in ensuring continuity of the family business over multi-
generations.
The roles and responsibilities of the board in governing innovation is clearly defined and includes:
- Review and approve innovation strategy
- Control of resources
- Monitoring of outcome and performance of C-suite in innovation execution
Board meeting agenda includes innovation strategy and review on a regular basis.
There are board members with innovation experience who champion innovation governance agenda.
Nomination committee has clear criteria for innovation attributes when appointing C-suite executives.
There is clarity in terms of innovation drivers and their area of responsibilities.
The decision authority and empowerment limit for innovation investment is clearly structured.
Family Influence 
Factors - Control

















Board Roles & 
Responsibilities












(1 = Not at all; 2 = To a small 
extent; 3 = To a moderate extent; 
4 = To a great extent; 5 = To a 
very great extent.)
Innovation priority is defined and shared across the organization, e.g. business model innovation, new product 
innovation, process innovation, supply chain innovation.
There is guidance on innovation focus aligned to business strategy with clarity on "What we will not do", 
including industry boundaries, product scope, value chain etc.
Depth of Innovation
There is clear alignment of expectations in terms of areas where we will drive incremental innovation (exploit) 
and where we will invest in disruptive (explore) innovation.
Internal vs External
We have established an understanding of areas of innovation where we will seek external partnerships and 
those that we will develop internally.
Types of Partnership
We are clear in terms of the types of partnerships we will establish for effective innovation outcomes, e.g. joint 
venture, outsourced partners for research and development, co-creation with industry partners etc.
 Quantum
We have an understanding of our investment appetite in various areas of innovation in the organization. It may 
not be a defined investment budget but a broad guideline of what is palatable to the organization in terms of 
investment size and return from innovation investment. 
Portfolio 
We have a dashboard of innovation investments (portfolio) across the organization. The board and C-suite 
regularly review the portfolio to ensure it meets the organization's growth strategy.
There is an understanding of the time horizon that the organization would be comfortable with for reaping 
benefit from innovation investment & initiatives.
We have alignment of our innovation investment priorities for short term, mid term and long term.
Time Horizon









How Much to 
Innovate?
With Whom to 
Innovate?










(1 = Not at all; 2 = To a small 
extent; 3 = To a moderate extent; 




There is an established process in generating ideas, detecting emerging weak signals from the market and 
uncovering innovation opportunities.
The decision process to invest in innovation resources for new ideas generated is well managed and agile.
There is a process to make decisions on aborting or accelerating the investment into a project depending on the 
initial results of innovation incubation.
There is a strong innovation culture in the organization where people proactively experiment with new ideas 
and continuously seek improvement in the current work process.
Top management shows commitment to innovation and communicates regularly on innovation outcomes and 
learnings.
Domain Expertise We have strong domain expertise in our organization to innovate and deliver increased values to stakeholders.
Soft skills 
Our staff possess the necessary soft skills to drive innovation, including customer sensing, ideas and concept 
evaluation, team management and venture management.
We continuously seek ways to upskill our people, including training, on-the-job experiential learning, exposure 
etc.
While the family business values employees as their expanded family, non-performers are not tolerated. 
Injection of new talent is done to ensure strong human capital in the organization.
Board Performance Shareholders have clear expectations and set performance indicators on innovation governance for the board.
Top Management 
Performance






There is clarity in measuring the success of innovation outcomes and such measures are shared at every level of 
the organization, e.g. percentage of revenue generated from new products launched in the past 3 years, number 




















Research into the corporate governance of innovation is at its nascent stage. 
When focusing specifically on family business research, we discovered a void in 
the CGOI literature. By focusing our research on Singapore Chinese family firms, 
we uncovered specific family-influenced factors, understood the decision-making 
processes for innovation investments and the complexity introduced by the nature 
of family businesses in which family, business and individual intersect. This 
research contributes to the body of knowledge regarding the CGOI with a focus on 
Singapore Chinese family businesses, and it serves to inform practitioners through 
providing a model showing the various antecedents and constructs of the CGOI in 
Chinese family firms.  
 
There are seven propositions derived from our research: 
 
Proposition 1 The more pronounced the innovation agenda enacted, the higher 
the motivation level of the board and management to make 
innovation work. 
Proposition 2 The greater the domain expertise and experience in innovation 
management at the board level, the more pronounced the firm’s 
corporate governance of innovation. 
Proposition 3 The greater the expectation of shareholders vis-à-vis 
organisational innovation outcomes, the higher the motivation 
level of the board in driving the corporate governance of 
innovation. 




Proposition 4 The antecedents to a strong corporate governance of innovation in 
Singapore Chinese family businesses are: 
• Cohesiveness among family members involved in the business 
management 
• Commitment to ensure multi-generation continuity of their 
family business  
• A decision-maker that has controlling power over the business 
Proposition 5 The clarity of corporate governance of innovation increases with 
the level of innovation leadership exhibited by family leaders of 
Chinese family firms. 
Proposition 6 An increased emphasis on the corporate governance of innovation 
in the board agenda increases the effectiveness of innovation 
investment portfolio management. 
Proposition 7 The stronger the family culture of tolerating long-term employees 
who are non-performers, the weaker the innovation culture and 
greater resistance to change. 
 
There are opportunities of future research on these propositions using 










4.2.1 Theoretical Implications 
 
• Agency Theory 
 
Scholars have found that several potential sources of agency costs exist in 
family firms arising from altruism and self-control (Schulze et al., 2001; 
Kallmuenzer, 2015). This includes factors such as family owner-managers less 
stringently appraising family members’ job performance or the tendency to employ 
a family member over more qualified managers. In our research, we found that 
Singapore Chinese family owner-managers treat long-serving employees as their 
expanded family. There are also indications from our research data that indicate 
leniency in appraising these “expanded family members”. Hence, our research 
contributes additional potential agency cost sources in family firms that may arise 
due to Chinese family leaders viewing long-serving employees as part of their 
family.  
 
In our research, the family influence factor “control” emerged as an 
antecedent to proper execution of the CGOI. This is supported by the agency theory 
where the “principal-principal” agency cost is said to arise due to the misalignment 
of interests between majority and minority shareholders (Porta et al., 1999; 
Anderson & Reeb, 2003). In our CGOI model for Singapore Chinese family firms, 
we found that it is key to have a family leader who has control and decision-making 
power over business operations. This both removes the “principal-principal” agency 
cost and enables organisations to reduce the friction in driving innovation. 
 




• Behavioural Agency Model  
 
The behavioural agency model posits that strategic decisions are ‘reference 
dependent’ and that decision-makers are primarily “loss averse” (Wiseman & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). In our research, we find that Singapore Chinese family 
leaders in four case studies are strongly committed to innovation since they are 
committed to ensuring the “continuity” of their business over multi-generations. 
Their commitment to innovation is driven by their “survival” instincts and they felt 
that innovation is key to ensuring the survivability of their business. This is aligned 
with the BAM model which states that decision-makers are primarily “loss averse”. 
‘Loss averse’ refers to when the decision-maker favours options that avoid loss of 
their current wealth over options that optimise future wealth (Wiseman & Gomez-
Mejia, 1998). In our research, we observed that Chinese family leaders spoke about 
driving innovation to ensure continuity of their business and not about optimising 
future wealth. Their intent to ensure survivability of their business is also driven by 
socioemotional wealth and not just financial wealth. Chinese family leaders are 
influenced by Confucius values where passing down of family business built by 
their forefathers is part of filial piety. The need to perpetuate the family identity is 
important to Chinese family leaders and that represents a key driver that affects the 
decision-making process of Chinese family business in their investment into 
innovation. The BAM supports our CGOI model where “commitment to ensure 
continuity of their family business” is a key antecedent to Chinese family businesses 
driving the CGOI. 
 
 




• Stewardship Theory 
 
Stewardship theory states that man is driven by higher-level needs such as self-
actualisation, social contribution, loyalty and generosity as well as intrinsic needs 
tied to personal motivations (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson, 
1990). Our research data support the stewardship theory as the Singapore Chinese 
family leaders demonstrated motivation beyond personal gains. From our research 
data, we observed that Chinese family business leaders spoke about contributing 
back to society and ensuring well being of their long-serving employees. Their 
desire to contribute to greater goods beyond personal wealth and individual gains 
are also observed from our interviews. Chinese family business leaders in our case 
study have also exhibited stewardship leadership described by Miller et al. (2008) 
where they exhibit long-termism in building their business as well as nurturing 
motivated, well-trained and loyal employees with a community culture. 
 
However, stewardship leadership traits (Miller, Le Breton‐Miller & Scholnick, 
2008) exhibited by family firm leaders are not sufficient for driving the governance 
of innovation. Our research uncovers the need for innovation leadership to provide 
clarity regarding innovation vision and the structure of innovation drivers. 
Stewardship leadership trait (Miller et al., 2008) of nurturing employees with a 
community culture has to be complemented with innovation leadership emphasising 
the need to innovate. Innovation culture has to be inculcated in the organization to 
ensure employees have the right mindset coupled with training to equip them with 
the right skillset to drive innovation effectively. 
 




• Resource-based View 
 
 The “familiness” model of RBV described family business resources as “the 
bundle of resources that are distinctive to a firm as a result of family involvement” 
(Habbershon & Williams, 1999, p. 1). In our research, we reveal that “familiness” 
factors impact the governance of innovation in Singapore Chinese family firms. The 
CGOI model contributes to the RBV literature in the area of innovation governance. 
The unique family factors that strengthen or weaken the pursuit of innovation 
outcomes are described in our SWOT analysis in Section 4.1.1. The data from this 
research also support the resource-based view in which social capital is cited to 
entail a positive effect on product innovation (De Massis et al., 2015).  
 
Due to the uniqueness of family business where individual, business and family 
intersects, we found three “familiness” (Habbershon & Williams, 1999) factors that 
have to be present before Singapore Chinese family businesses can ensure a strong 
corporate governance of innovation: cohesiveness among family members involved 
in the business management, commitment to ensure multi-generation continuity of 
their family business and controlling power held by a decision-maker over the 
business. Sirmon and Hitt (2013) have found that effective management of 
“familiness” resources create competitive advantages and leads to wealth creation 
for family firms. Our CGOI model supports this proposition and provides a model 
for Chinese family business leaders to increase their effectiveness in managing the 
family influence factors to drive a strong corporate governance of innovation. 
 
 




4.2.2 Practical Implications 
 
 
Our research contributes to Singapore Chinese family business through the 
CGOI model that informs family leaders on antecedents to CGOI as well as the 
scope and depth of CGOI to enable effective execution in their organization. The 
SWOT analysis further informs Singapore Chinese family businesses on areas of 




In order to strike a balance between “governing” innovation at the corporate 
level and the need for agility and flexibility in driving innovation execution, we 
proposed a checklist to facilitate the board and management team to perform self-
assessment of gaps and raise awareness of its existing CGOI state. The checklist 
functions like a “risk register” that organisations may incorporate to ensure 
awareness of risk areas and that plans are in place to mitigate risk. This is part of 
risk management with a focus on the “future risks” of disruption and displacement 
or, in the words of one phase 1 interviewee, the “risk of omission vs risk of 
commission”. The checklist provides the level of details needed for board and 
management team to discuss and drive clarity across four building blocks of CGOI: 
innovation leadership, innovation strategy, innovation capabilities and innovation 
outcome. By expanding the four building blocks into eleven elements and 
incorporating indicators for self-assessment, we provide practitioners with tools that 
increase their execution finesse. A dashboard view in the form of spider web is 
proposed as a visual aid to board and management team to communicate effectively 
across the organization on their area of strength and weaknesses in CGOI. 




4.3 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 
The purpose of our research is to introduce constructs to explain the CGOI 
in Singapore Chinese family firms, however refining and validating these constructs 
lies outside the scope of this study. We have also put forth seven propositions 
derived from our research. Future research can include quantitative studies to 
further validate these propositions. Quantitative studies can also be done in future 
to extend the external validity and generalisability of our findings.  
 
 In our study, we uncovered three antecedents to proactiveness of board in 
driving CGOI and three antecedents to establishing CGOI in Singapore Chinese 
family businesses. Future studies can be done to further examine additional 
antecedents that may not be covered in our current research. 
 
 Due to time and access constraints, our research utilises case studies of four 
Singapore Chinese family businesses. Future research can expand the study to 
Chinese family businesses in different national settings in order to examine whether 
there are country-specific factors that affect the corporate governance of innovation 
in Chinese family firms.  
 
 The study of the CGOI in family businesses is at a nascent stage. Our 
research achieves initial steps towards deepening the understanding of constructs 
that impact the effective governance of innovation in the complex setting of 
Singapore Chinese family businesses. However, as with any qualitative research, it 
includes several limitations that lay the foundations for future research. We have 




used four case studies in our research and with the limited number of cases, our 
findings cannot be generalized with the same degree of certainty that quantitative 
analyses can. In qualitative research, the researcher is the primary instrument of 
data collection and analysis. In this regard, there could be a limitation due to the 
biases of the researcher. The research findings have not been tested to discover 
whether they are statistically significant or due to chance. As with any qualitative 
research, it is also challenging to establish a cause-effect connection between the 
constructs that we posit in our CGOI model. 
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Appendix A: Interview questions for Expert panel 
 
1. What role do you think board should play in the organization’s innovation 
strategy and execution? (Advisory vs monitoring or not at all?) 
2. What are the key areas that should fall under board governance for innovation?  
Examples: 
• Reviewing innovation strategies (Why, What, How much?) 
• Managing innovation risks (How) 
• Auditing innovation effectiveness and assessing innovation 
performance (Outcome) 
• Appointing top management with innovation focus (Who) 
3. To what extend (on a scale of 0-10, 10 being most extensive) do you think 
boards in Singapore are driving innovation governance? Why? (competency, 
awareness of role, clarity of processes and structure) 
4. What do you think needs to be done to increase the level of involvement of 
board in innovation governance?  
5. How would an audit framework help and where would it hurt? 
  




Appendix B: Interview Questions for Family Business Executives 
 
Current state of innovation 
 
1. On a scale of 0-10, how would you rate the importance of innovation to your 
company? 0 being totally not and 10 being highly important.  
Can you explain the rationale behind your rating? 
 
2. On a scale of 0-10, how would you rate your company in terms of 
innovativeness? 0 being totally not and 10 being highly innovative.  
Can you explain the rationale behind your rating? 
 
Innovation Strategy & Process 
 
3. Do you have an innovation strategy? Can you describe it? (Why, Where, 
What, When, Who, How) 
 
4. What is the process behind the approval of this innovation strategy? (Who 
propose, who approve. At board or C-level? How frequent is this process 
done?) 
 
5. Who is responsible for driving the innovation strategy in the company? 
 
6. How often is the strategy being reviewed and who monitors the progress? 
Who makes the decision to “Kill” or “Scale”? How do you measure the 
success for innovation investment? 





7. What is your current innovation portfolio, how many percent of your revenue 
is contributed from new services/products launched in the last 12-18 months?  
 
8. How much are your investing into new business/innovation in terms of 
percentage? 
 
Roles of Board vs C-level 
 
9. What role does the board play in the innovation process? 
 
10. From your view, what have the board done well and what are the area of 
improvements needed to drive effective innovation governance? 
 
11. How about C-level? What role do they play in the innovation process? what 
have the executives done well and what are the area of improvements needed 
to drive effective innovation management? 
 
Antecedents to Board’s effectiveness in driving innovation governance 
 
12. How are the boards selected? Are there key members who are driving 
innovation governance at the board level? 
 
13. What are the factors that you felt affects the focus of the board on innovation? 
 
